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I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamic nature of our economic system and its explosive
rate of growth over the past one hundred years, has occasioned an
alarming rate of growth in both the business community and its
related support industries. Law firms have grown to immense pro-
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portions in response to an ever-increasing demand for professional
services. And, more germane to this Article, accounting firms have
likewise ridden this rising tide, providing support services to all
members of this growing business community.
This growth in both the business community and its support
services counterparts has occasioned much discussion, analyzing
the extent to which these participants should be responsible to the
persons whose lives are affected by this growth. To the extent that
sellers of goods and services draw sustenance from the open
streams of commerce, these waters should be protected from the
pollutants of defective goods. Courts readily recognize that defec-
tive goods injure not only the purchasers but also users of these
goods otherwise removed from the contractual, buyer-seller rela-
tionship. But what of sellers of defective services? Until recently
the courts have been unwilling to expand the liablility of account-
ants for negligently rendered audit services beyond the immediate
auditor-client contractual relationship. However, this trend is
changing. In recent years, the notion that accountants should be
likewise responsible to all users of audited financial statements is
gaining in popularity.'
Congress acted first on behalf of the investing public by recog-
nizing the need for someone to police the nature and quality of
available financial information. Congress interposed the Certified
Public Accountant (CPA) between industry and the investing pub-
lic, choosing to protect the public by requiring full disclosure of
relevant information in the issuance of securities, rather than the
passage on the quality of the investment itself. The main thrust of
the federal legislation was to "place the owners of securities on a
parity, so far as possible, with the management of the corporations,
and to place the buyer on the same plan so far as available infor-
mation is concerned with the seller. ' '2
1. This is due in part to the nature of the economic development of the
American business community. One commentator has identified three historical
trends and events, which themselves have greatly contributed to the growing
scope of professional responsibility. These are: first, the beginning of the modern
capitalistic system at the turn of the century; second, the enactment of federal
securities legislation intended to implement a policy of full disclosure; and third,
the rise of public ownership of the American corporation. Mess, Accountants and
the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 838 (1977).
No longer does the "age-old axiom that physicians bury their mistakes while...
accountants file theirs away" ring true. Id. at 838.
2. Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third Par-
[Vol. 11:123
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/2
AUDITOR NEGLIGENCE
Because of his unique relationship to the subject financial in-
formation, the auditor is the most likely screener of this informa-
tion. As between a corporation and its investors, his professional
judgment is a filter of cynicism, ensuring that the investor has
complete information upon which to base an investment decision.
However, the auditor does not pass on the quality of the invest-
ment but rather the quality of the information respecting the in-
vestment. Financial statements are a principal means of communi-
cating business information to outside investors. It is this
information, over which the auditor exercises his professional judg-
ment, that is the subject of this Article.'
ties, 23 CASE W. RES. 113, 126-27 (1971). "In the broadest sense the function of
accounting and of the audit by an independent public accountant is to facilitate
the operation of our economic system." D. CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUB-
LIc ACCOUNTANTS 1 (rev. ed. 1982). "Accountants and auditors.., play an impor-
tant role in enabling our free market to allocate private property rights to their
highest valued uses as measured by the dollar votes of demand. Perfect competi-
tion requires efficient markets supplied with complete information." Furthermore,
"accurate information is essential to the efficient use and exchange of property,"
which "forms the basis of our economic freedom." Id.
3. While publicly-held entities are required to disclose information in audited
financial statements, nonpublicly held entities have the option of preparing: (1)
audited financial statements; (2) financial statement reviews; or (3) financial
statement compilations.
A financial statement review involves "[plerforming inquiry and analytical
procedures that provide the accountant with a reasonable basis for expressing
limited assurance that there are no material modifications that should be made to
the [financial] statements in order for them to be in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles . . ." Statements on Standards for Accounting
and Review Services No. 2, § 110.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1987) [hereinafter Professional Standards].
A financial statement compilation involves merely assisting in the prepara-
tion of financial statements "without undertaking to express any assurance on the
statements." Id. at §100.04.
For purposes of analysis, this Article is devoted to discussing auditor liability
with respect to audited financial statements. Here it is critical to outline the dis-
tinction between the objectives of an audit and those of a lesser undertaking, such
as a financial statement review. The objective of a financial statement review also
differs significantly from the objective of an examination of financial statements
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. The objective of an au-
dit is to provide a reasonable basis for expressing an opinion regarding the finan-
cial statements taken as a whole. A review does not provide a basis for the expres-
sion of such an opinion because a review does not contemplate a study and
evaluation of internal accounting control, tests of accounting records and of re-
sponses to inquiries by obtaining corroborating evidential matter through inspec-
tion, observation or confirmation, and certain other procedures ordinarily per-
1989] 125
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The nature of today's financial information is changing faster
than the public user can respond. The public is beginning to rely
more heavily on the auditors of this information, imposing upon
the professional a level of social responsibility unparalleled by that
of prior years." This increasing reliance on the accounting profes-
sion is the focus of this Article. This paper will raise and discuss
two interrelated issues. First, to whom, if anyone, should an audi-
tor be held liable for negligence in the performance of his profes-
sional duties? Second, accepting the current system of legal re-
sponsibilities, what is the profession doing to satisfy society's
demands for more and better information?
This Article will present and analyze these questions in terms
of'the accountant's common law negligence liability to third-party
users of financial information. This Article will discuss the distinc-
tion between professional standards and legal standards. It will
then focus on a discussion of the common law as it relates to the
notion of holding a CPA liable to a third-party user of audited fi-
nancial statements. It will conclude by discussing some policy im-
plications of expanding the scope of the CPA's responsibility to
third persons and suggest a few general guidelines for a more effec-
tive system of allocating the risks and responsibilities of financial
information among the producers and users of the information.
II. THE LEGAL STANDARD
This section is devoted to identifying the proper legal stan-
dard of liability, considered in light of the various standards of
quality and disclosure applicable to the profession. However, one
must first divorce these notions of legal standards from considera-
tions of whom these standards protect. Assuming that auditors owe
some duty to third-party users of audited financial information,
this section endeavors to identify the proper legal standard against
which the given duty is measured. When that which is given falls
short of that which is owed, legal liability should follow. This sec-
formed during an audit. A review may bring to the accountant's attention
significant matters affecting the financial statements, but it does not provide as-
surance that the accountant will become aware of all significant matters that
would be disclosed in an audit. Professional Standards No. 2, § 100.04 (Am Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accountants 1987). For discussion concerning accountant liabil-
ity for financial statement review and compilation engagements, See Note, Ac-
countant's Liability for Compilation and Review Engagements, 60 TEx. L. REV.
759 (1982).
4. 70 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY Feb. 1986.
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tion begins with a discussion of generally accepted accounting
principals (hereinafter "GAAP") and then focuses on a discussion
of the law as it relates to professional responsibility based on the
nature of financial information.
Financial statements are prepared in accordance with GAAP.'
GAAP describes a body of accounting principles, with which an
auditor must be versed to express an opinion on the financial
statements. GAAP is a mixture of the proclamations of many dif-
ferent sources.6 And while uniformity is a desired element of any
financial reporting system, GAAP is not the panacea that its name
seems to indicate.
GAAP do not supply ready made answers. Since financial
statements are the responsibilty of the client's management, not
the auditor, the client's accounting and other officers have both
authority and responsibility to determine the relevance, appropri-
ateness and manner of application of specific rules and to make
accounting judgments reflected in the financial statements . . ..
Whatever problems are inherent in defining GAAP, they pale
when compared to those encountered in giving life and legal sub-
stance to that definition. An accounting system, shaped and con-
toured by accounting principles and procedures, is nothing more
than a model. A model which, when given raw data, is capable of
generating a pre-programmed result, the financial statements.
Much of the difficulty associated with understanding financial in-
formation stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of the re-
5. GAAP "is a technical accounting term which encompasses the conventions,
rules, and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a partic-
ular time. It includes not only broad guidelines of general application, but also
detailed practices and procedures." Professional Standards No. 1, § 411.02 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1987).
6. These sources include:
(a) SEC Accounting Rules;
(b) SEC Accounting Series Releases;
(c) Pronouncements by the Financial Accounting Standards Board on ac-
counting and financial reporting;
(d) Pronouncements by the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants [hereinafter "AICPA"];
(e) Interpretations and other publications of the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board, the AICPA, and other professional bodies;
(f) Other professional accounting and auditing publications; and,
(g) Accepted application in accounting and auditing practice.
R. GORMLEY, THE LAW OF ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS, 1-27 - 1-29 (1981).
7. Id. at 1-30.
1989]
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sults produced by this model. There is a tendency among lay per-
sons using financial information to treat this information as
"facts," items of independent significance. This is entirely incon-
sistent with the fundamemtal nature of financial information, that
it is the end result of many and varied assumptions, policies and
economic hypothetications:8
Thus, the current accounting model is likely to mislead the
layman, unaware of its qualifications, into believing it depicts the
facts of the real world and therefore is inappropriate for lay users.
The next logical question is whether we can develop a model that
can be used by laymen. In the meantime, the question of immedi-
ate interest ... is whether accountants should be held liable for
the limitations of the current accounting model which mislead lay
investors.'
The above discussion raises the immediate issue of whether
and to what extent the professional standards of GAAP coexist
with and serve as the legal standard of professional responsibility.
A leading case respecting this issue is United States v. Simon.10
The case involved a criminal action brought against accountants
alleging criminal violations of the federal securities regulations."
The accountants disclaimed criminal responsibility, asserting in
their defense their purported compliance with GAAP. In their
defense, the accountants proffered the. testimony of eight expert
witnesses, each affirming the defendants compliance with GAAP.
Thereon, the accountants argued that the jury should be conclu-
sively bound by the expert testimony respecting their compliance
8. One commentator has described this erroneous tendency as the Pygma-
lion Syndrome; "believing that the facts, rather than a modular abstraction of the
facts, are contained in financial statements. They are not." Fiflis, Current
Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31,
42 (1975). This fact-result distinction is best illustrated by example. Assuming
that a business purchased equipment for a certain price, it must then decide over
what life and under what method it will depreciate this equipment. The deprecia-
tion method and life chosen will directly dictate the amount of depreciation ex-
pense and accumulated depreciation the business shows on its financial state-
ments. In this situation, it is erroneous to consider the depreciation information
as a set of facts because their existence is subject to change based on the method
of depreciation followed. Following this analysis, it is clear that the "facts" con-
tained in financial statements are not facts at all, they are merely results.
9. Id. at 45.
10. 425 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1969).
11. Id. at 798.
12. Id. at 805.
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with GAAP. 3 The accountants argued that, insofar as their re-
quired disclosures were mandated by GAAP, expert testimony that
GAAP did not require disclosures would preclude liability for their
absence.14
Judge Friendly laid this argument to rest in short order. The
court held that the critical test was not compliance with GAAP but
whether the financial statements, taken as a whole, present fairly
the enclosed financial information.16 Of the proper consideration of
expert testimony, Judge Friendly wrote:
We do not think the jury was also required to accept the account-
ants' [expert witnesses'] evaluation whether a given fact was ma-
terial to overall fair presentation, at least not when the account-
ants' testimony was not based on specific rules or prohibitions to
which they could point, but only on the need for the auditor to
make an honest judgment and their conclusion that nothing in
the financial statements themselves negated the conclusion that
an honest judgment had been made. Such evidence may be highly
persuasive, but it is not conclusive ......
Having established that GAAP represents but a small portion
of the auditor's duty to disclose, the next question involves a de-
termination of to whom does he owe this duty? The answer to this
question invites a discussion of the common law as it relates to an
auditor's liablility to third parties for negligence in the audit
13. Id. Professor Fiflis discusses the general nature of liability, in the face of
conformity with the standards of GAAP, beginning with what he calls the "Inapt
Analogy of Medical Malpractice." Fiflis, supra note 8, at 66. Fiflis describes this
by analogy to evidentiary considerations involved in medical malpractice cases.
These evidentiary considerations bind the jury to the testimony of an expert wit-
ness concerning the custom in the profession and require that the plaintiff pro-
duce evidence of nonconformity with the custom of the profession, before he is
entitled to recover damages. Id. Although acknowledging their erroneous juxtapo-
sition, Fiflis notes the tendancy among many commentators and judges to apply
this medical standard to accountant liability cases. Id. at 67.
14. Simon, 425 F.2d at 806.
15. Id. at 805-06.
16. Id. at 806. This statement presumably foretells a different result when
specific rules or prohibitions, rather then expert testimony, are involved. How-
ever, such result is not to be. In Hertzfeld v. Laventhol, [1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court precluded a CPA
from asserting GAAP as a shield. The court upheld the legal duty as one of full
disclosure, noting that this duty "cannot be fulfilled merely by following [GAAP].
... [A]ccountants ... must take pains to lay bare all the facts needed by investors
to interpret the financial statements accurately." Id. at 95,999. See United States
v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
19891
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III. COMMON LAW ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
The liability of accountants at common law has been the sub-
ject of extensive litigation, resulting in a substantial difference of
opinion among the states17 as to the proper standard of liability.
17. While this Article does not take up the issue of auditor liability under the
federal securities laws, a brief discussion is nonetheless included here. Under
many provisions of the federal securities laws, negligence actions will lie against
accountants in favor of third parties. This is in part due to the nature and pur-
pose of the securities regulations, which interpose the auditor between the corpo-
ration and its investors, in order that management's representations are scruti-
nized and that any information bearing on a reasonable person's investment
decision is included in the audited financial statements.
Some provisions of the federal securities laws impose standards of responsi-
bility more stringent than those of common law on persons associated with securi-
ties transactions, including secondary defendants such as accountants and audi-
tors. See GORMLEY, supra note 6, at 1-11.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes substantial liability on per-
sons associated with registration statements containing any misstatement of a
material fact or any omission of a material fact required to be stated or necessary
to make the statements not misleading. Persons responsible under section 11 for
the contents of a registration statement are the registrant itself, its chief execu-
tive, financial and accounting officers who are required to sign the registration
statement, each present and prospective director or partner of the registrant,
every accountant and other professional expert whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him with his consent (e.g., and audit opinion), and every
underwriter0 of the registered securities. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(11)(9a)(1-5) (1982).
The prerequisite to liability under this section is a material misstatement or
omission in a registration statement for shares registered under the 1933 Act.
Under this section, unlike any of the common law approaches, the plaintiff need
not prove:
(a) negligence or fraud by the auditor in auditing financial statements;
(b) reliance on the auditor's opinion;
(c) a causal relationship between the omission or misstatement and the plain-
tiff's loss; or,
(d) any contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the auditor.
See GORMLEY, supra note 6 at 7.2 to 7.3. Rather, the touchstone of liability is
materiality. In Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), the court first attempted to define materiality under section 11. The Escott
plaintiffs sued the corporate registrant, alleging material misstatements and omis-
sions in financial statements included in the registration statement, joining as de-
fendants Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., the corporate auditors. Id. at 652. The
basis of the suit was an overstatement of income and assets, alleged by the inves-
tors as the basis for their investment in convertible debentures otherwise consid-
ered speculative investments, based on the growth potential of the corporate is-
[Vol. 11:123
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From this morass, there have emerged four distinct theories of lia-
suer. Id. at 652-53. In defining materiality, the Escott Court noted:
[tihe average prudent investor is not concerned with minor inaccuracies
or with errors as to matters which are of no interest to him. The facts
which tend to deter him from purchasing a security are facts which have
an important bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corpo-
ration or its business.
Id. at 651. The court went on to note that materiality is, by definition, a subjec-
tive inquiry. The determination of what is in fact material "comes down to a
question of judgment, to be exercised by the trier of fact as best he can in light of
all the circumstnaces." Id. at 652. The court then held that the fact that the earn-
ings had increased only 256% from the prior year, as opposed to the reported
276% increase, was not a sufficient disparity so as to deter the ordinary investor
from his investment decision. Id. at 651.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes similar liability on the auditors
of information filed pursuant to its provisions. Under section 18(a), an auditor can
be held liable for losses suffered by purchasers or sellers of securities who relied
on a materially false or misleading opinion on audited financial statements. Un-
like liability under the 1933 Act, the plaintiff here must prove reliance on the
allegedly false or misleading statement in making his investment decision and
that at the time of his action he was not aware that the information was false or
misleading.
The leading case imposing section 18(a) liability is Rich v. Touche, Ross &
Co., 415 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Rich, the plaintiffs sued the corporate
auditor, alleging reliance on materially misstated financial statements, as the ba-
sis for their lost investment. Respecting the section 18(a) allegation of fraud, the
court described the section 18(a) cause of action as requiring a "strict 'double-
barreled'" causation requirement. Id. at 103. Under section 18(a), the plaintiffs
must prove: first, that his damages were caused by his reliance on the false or
misleading statement; and second, that the purchase or sale price was affected by
the false or misleading statement. Id. at 103. Thus, the plaintiff must prove reli-
ance and causation under section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, whereas there are no
similar requirements under Section 11 of the 1933 Act.
In recent years, the notion that the SEC itself could impose sanctions, inde-
pendent of investors' rights or recovery under the above discussed sections, has
come to fruition. In Touch, Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2nd Cir. 1979), the
Second Circuit held that the SEC could impose sanctions against an accounting
firm, under rule 2(e) of the 1934 Act. Rule 2(e) provides in pertinent part that:
[t]he Commission may deny... the privilege of appearing or practicing
before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission.. .(i)
not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others or (ii) to be
lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or im-
proper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully
aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities
laws . . . or the rules or regulations thereunder.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1979).
In Touche, the court for the first time upheld the sanction authority of the
SEC against accountants. The action began when the SEC enjoined Touche from
1989]
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bility."8 The theme common to all theories discussed is the court's
further representations, pending an investigation of whether the firm had "en-
acted in unethical, unprofessional or fraudulent conduct in their audits of the
financial statements . . ." of several of their audit clients. 609 F.2d at 573. The
SEC alleged numerous violations of the relevant securities laws provisions as a
basis for sanction. In upholding the validity of the rules, the court held that:
Rule 2(e) . . . represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the
integrity of its own processes .... As such, the rule is "reasonably re-
lated" to the purposes of the securities laws .... We therefore sustain
the validity of the Rule as a necessary adjunct to the Commission's
power to protect ... the public in general.
Id. at 574. For an interesting opinion respecting the administrative authority of
the SEC to issue a "stop order" based on a material overstatement of inventories
presented in financial statements, see Miami Window Corp., 41 S.E.C. 68 (1962).
The SEC issued a "stop order" to prevent the corporation from filing a registra-
tion statement under the 1933 Act, pending resolution of an inventory valuation
issue. The Commission asserted that the auditors did not comply with generally
accepted auditing standards in their observations of inventories and had not ade-
quately justified their departure from GAAP. The stop order was directed at the
registration statement itself, of which the audit report was an integral part. Id. at
71.
Much of the legal tension respecting accountants' liability to third-party
users of financial information, however, has been in the state law forums. This
raises the issue of whether there is any good reason for imposing different stan-
dards of liability, in essentially the same situations, when such liability is so
closely tied to the forum in which the dispute is settled. Fiflis denies any good
reason at all. Fiflis, supra note 8, at 105.
The federal courts, construing the federal securities laws, have long since
recognized the fact that the profession is responsible not just to its im-
mediate employers, but also to the investing public. How can courts con-
tinue the ludicrous fiction that accountants serve their payors only for
state law purposes, but the public investors for federal purposes?
Id. at 105-06. The strength of this argument is apparent when considered in light
of the standard of responsibility that the profession accepts for itself in its code of
professional ethics; "[a] distinguishing mark of a professional in his acceptance of
responsibility to the public." Professional Standards No. 2, § 51.01 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1987). "The responsibility of a [certified] public ac-
countant is not only to the client who pays [his] fee, but also to investors, credi-
tors and others who may rely on the financial statements which he certifies."
Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629 at 670 (1957).
18. This difference of opinion has also occasioned extensive scholarly com-
mentary. See, e.g., Besser, Privity? - An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of
Accountants to Third Parties, 6 SETON HALL 507 (1976); Eizenstat & Speer, Ac-
countants' Professional Liability: Expanding Exposure, 22 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 7
(1972); Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants, Responsibilities to Third Par-
ties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31 (1975); Gormley, The Foreseen, the Foreseeable, and
Beyond: Accountants' Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL 528 (1984); Griffin,
The Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759 (1976);
[Vol. 11:123
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expansion of the common law negligence cause of action to allow
recovery by an expanding group of plaintiffs. Common to each of
these discussions are the judicial concerns of unlimited liability,
the notion that an auditor may eventually be held accountable to
the entire would, and attenuation, the notion that a given plain-
tiff's injuries are so remote that they cannot possibly have sprung
forth from the auditor's negligent act.
Historically, the law has denied tort recovery for the negligent
performance of a contract when the claimant was no party to the
contract.19 In 1916, Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo broke with
tradition. Judge Cardozo's insight opened the courthouse doors to
persons claiming negligent injury, not as an element of a contract
involving the defendant, but as a separate legal action standing on
its own. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,20 Judge Cardozo al-
lowed the buyer of an automobile with a defective wheel to bring
an action directly against the manufacturer of the car, without re-
gard to the fact that the wheel was actually built by another
party.21 Judge Cardozo held that a negligently built automobile
was a thing of danger to the ultimate user. Where "danger was to
Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 797 (1959); Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability - How Far Do We
Go?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1967); Kurland, Accountants' Legal Liability: Ul-
tramares to BarChris, 25 Bus. LAW. 155 (1969); Menzel, The Defense of Contribu-
tory Negligence in Accountants' Malpractice Actions, 13 SETON HALL 292 (1983);
Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 838 (1977); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of
Accountants Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 56 (1968); Wiener, Com-
mon Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepre-
sentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983); Comment, Accountants' Liability to
the Third Party and Public Policy: A Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689 (1985);
Comment, Auditors' Liability - Adoption of a Reasonable Foreseeability Stan-
dard, 18 U. RicH. L. REV. 221 (1983); Note, Failure to Maintain Independence: A
Proposed Cause of Action Against Accountants, 62 TEx. L. REV. 923 (1984);
(hereinafter Failure to Maintain Independence); Note, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler:
A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extension of an Auditor's Legal Duty, 48 ALA. L.
REV. 876 (1984); Note, Rosenblum v. Adler, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (1984); Note,
Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 588 (1972).
19. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Ang. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842)
(personal injury involving stagecoach accident); Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337
(1889) (economic injury from negligent misrepresentation in securities
prospectus).
20. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
21. Id. at 1051.
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be expected as reasonable certain, there was a duty of vigi-
lance . . .2 The defendant's failure to respond to this duty was
actionable by the plaintiff.23 This was the first American case al-
lowing tort recovery for personal injury for a negligently manufac-
tured item, apart from any allowable contractual recovery.
Judge Cardozo expanded the scope of this rule six years later
to include tort recovery for negligently inflicted economic injury in
Glanzer v. Shepard.24 In Glanzer, the court allowed a bean buyer
to bring an action against the public weigher hired by the seller to
certify the weight of the beans.2' The buyer asserted that the
weigher was negligent in his duties. Accordingly, the certificate of
weight, which was the basis of the contract between the seller and
buyer, was significantly overstated.26 In holding that the buyer
could recover his economic loss from the weigher, the court ad-
vanced the notion that one can recover for negligently inflicted ec-
onomic injury, based upon his close relationship to the actual par-
ties to the contract. The court held that:
[t]he plaintiff's use of the certificates was not an indirect or col-
lateral consequence of the action of the weighers .... It was...
the end and aim of the transaction .... The defendants held
themselves out to the public as skilled and careful in their calling
.... In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing
was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of
all whose conduct was to be governed.2
Under this analysis, the fact that the plaintiff was not in priv-
ity with the original contract did not bar recovery. The recovery
was based on the relationship between the plaintiff and the parties
to the contract. Practical substance triumphed over legal form.
A. Privity and the Primary Benefit Rule
In 1931, Judge Cardozo declined the opportunity to expand
tort liability for economic loss against an accounting firm in Ul-
tramares v. Touche, Niven & Co. 8 Instead, Judge Cardozo re-
22. Id. at 1055.
23. Id.
24. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 275-76 (emphasis added).
28. 255 N.Y. at __, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). The first American case to
address the issue of negligence liability of a CPA to a third-party user of financial
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treated to privity notions, exculpating the accounting profession
from negligence liability for the next fifty years. In Ultramares, a
creditor sued the accounting firm that audited the financial state-
ments of the then-bankrupt debtor. The creditor claimed a loss
due to reliance on erroneous information in the debtors financial
statements, arguing that Touche, Niven & Co. had been negligent
in performing their audit procedures and citing numerous discrep-
ancies and falsifications in the accounts receivables reported on the
audited financial statements.29
information was Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 197 A. 783 (1919). In Landell,
the court denied liability absent a showing that the plaintiff stood in a relation-
ship of privity with the accountant such that there is a duty imposed under the
law to act with due care respecting this third part. Landell, 264 Pa. at , 197
A. at 784.
29. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at __ , 174 N.E. 441 at 443-44. The audited bal-
ance sheet indicated a net worth of over one million dollar based, in part, how-
ever, on overvalued and fictitious accounts receivable. In fact, the company was
insolvent at the balance sheet date and at all times thereafter when plaintiffs
extended credit to the bankruptcy debtor. Plaintiff's original complaint asserted
claims for both negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial court dis-
missed the fraud claim and granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
the negligence issue, based on lack of privity. While Ultramares is widely known
as the privity impediment to negligence claims, it is the privity element, when
considered with the nature of the claim, that determines the outcome of the case.
255 N.Y. at -, id. at 448. Whereas the lack of privity was a bar to plaintiff's
negligence claim, a cause of action sounded in fraud suffers no similar frailty, 255
N.Y. at __ , id. at 443.
Inherent in this fraud-negligence distinction is the realization that, while
Judge Cardozo did not foreclose liability for negligence, he recognized the then-
limited influence of the accounting profession in the business community. Despite
evidence of negligence, Judge Cardozo refused, on policy grounds, to expand the
accountant's negligence liability beyond its professional relationship with its
client:
To creditors and investors to whom [Stern] exhibited the certificate, the
defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was
notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not in-
tend to keep it to himself .... A different question develops when we ask
whether they owed a duty to these to make it without negligence. If lia-
bility for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may ex-
pose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business con-
ducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a
flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.
255 N.Y. at -, id. at 444.
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Chief Justice Cardozo described the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation as occuring when one who supplies information fails to
exercise reasonable care and, as a result, misinforms someone to
whom he owes a duty of care. 0 The court held that an accountant
could be liable only to the person who hired him or to a person
whom the accountant, at the time he audited the financial state-
ments, knew would rely on them."1 Although speaking in terms of
privity, it is important to note what the court did not do. The
court did not limit accountant liability along traditional privity of
contract lines. Instead, the court included within the permissible
scope of plaintiffs those whose use of the corporate representations
were the end and aim of the transaction.32 The court also consid-
ered the holding of Glanzer but distinguished it, noting:
[in Glanzer, there] was something more than the rendition of a
service in expectation that the one who ordered the certificate
would use it thereafter in the operations of his business as occa-
sion might require. Here was a case where there transmission of
the certificate to another was not merely one possibility among
30. 255 N.Y. at 174 N.E. at 444. The simplicity of this rule cloaks an interest-
ing issue with respect to an accountant's professional obligations. To the extent
that the financial statements remain the representations of management, not the
auditor, management supplies the information to a prospective investor. Profes-
sional Standards No. 1, § 100.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1987).
In the audit context, however, the auditor expresses an opinion on management
representations. To the extent that an investor relies on the audit opinion, this
rule correctly imposes liability on the auditor for his negligence. But what of
lesser engagements such as a financial statement review or compilation which in-
volve no similar auditor assurances? Negligence liability should be harder to
maintain in that the rule should account for the lesser degree of work performed
in these situations. To disregard the inherent limitations on the scope of the ac-
countant's work is tantamount to disregarding the nature of the instant contract
between the accountant and his client.
31. In Ultramares, the auditor gave the client the audited balance sheet and
32 sequentially numbered counterparts of the original. 255 N.Y. at -, 174
N.E. at 442. The auditor knew that the client would use the balance sheet but did
not actually know the intended use of the counterparts. Id. at -, 174 N.E. at
443-44.
32. Fiflis, 28 VAND. L. REV. at 105. Subsequent interpretations of Ultramares
support the conclusion that the rule permits actions by parties not directly in
privity where the accountant knows and understands that the financial state-
ments are intended for use by a particular party, for a particular purpose, and
that the accountant manifests his understanding of these circumstances through
some direct contact with that particular party. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Ar-
thur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985); See infra notes 35-39
and accompanying text.
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many, but the "end and aim of the transaction .... " In a word,
the service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was
primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in
name, a party to the contact, and only incidentally for that of the
formal promisee. In the case at hand, the service was primarily
for the Stern Company, a convenient instrumentality for use in
the development of the business, and only incidentally or collater-
ally for the use of those to whom Stern and his associates might
exhibit it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may change
with liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it will
change with liability for negligence.3
Later cases, following the primary benefit notion of liability
to third parties, give considerable support to the continued vitality
of the primary benefit rule. 4 In Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 35 the New York bench again reaffirmed its com-
33. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 445-48. The first serious challenge to the policies
of Ultramares is in the dissent of Lord Denning in Candler v. Crane, Christmas &
Co., 2 K.B. 164 (1951). Lord Denning concluded that the requirement of privity
disregards the realities of the audit function by insulating from liability the very
parties whose work is most heavily relied upon by investors stating:
[Accountants make reports on which other people . . . other than their
clients ... rely in the ordinary course of business . . . [They are] in my
opinion, in proper cases, apart from any contract in the matter, under a
duty to use reasonable care in preparation of their accounts and in the
making of their reports.
2 K.B. at 185.
34. In State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416
(1938), the court interpreted Ultramares to insulate an auditor from negligence
liability to third parties, in the absence of a contractual relationship:
We have held that in the absence of a contractual relationship or its
equivalent, accountants cannot be held liable for ordinary negligence in
preparing a certified balance sheet even though they are aware that the
balance sheet will be used to obtain credit .... Accountants, however,
may be liable to third parties, even where there is lacking, deliberate or
active fraud . . . [H]eedless and reckless disregard of consequence may
take the place of deliberate intention.
Id. at -, 15 N.E.2d at 418-19. Later New York cases refine the privity analy-
sis following the strict Ultramares approach without significant modification. See,
O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937);
Duce Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogan, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), aff's mem.,
285 A.D. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955); C.I.T. Fin. Corp. v. Glover,
224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955). For an excellent discussion of developing trends for
New York law under Ultramares See, Comment, Accountant Liability To Third
Parties: To What Extent Is Comparative Negligence A Defense?, 55 UMKC L.
Rzv. 608 (1987).
35. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985).
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mitment to the primary benefit theory of liability. The court held
that as a prerequisite to holding an accountant liable to a third-
party user of financial information not directly in privity of contact
with the accountant:
(1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial re-
ports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in
the furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended
to rely; and, (3) some conduct on the part of the accountants link-
ing them to that party or parties, which evinces the accountant's
understanding of that party or parties' reliance."'
The court noted that the above criteria do permit some measure of
flexibility; however, they "do not represent a departure from the
principles articulated in Ultramares [and] Glanzer ... but, rather,
they are intended to preserve the wisdom and policy set forth
therein. 37
The court dismissed the creditor's complaint against the ac-
countant despite an allegation in the complaint that the debtor
provided the creditor with copies of the audited financial state-
ments upon request of the creditor as a preqequisite to obtaining
credit and that the accounting firm knew, or should have known,
or was on notice that, the audited financial statements were being
shown to potential creditors for the purpose of obtaining credit. 8
In so holding, the court analyzed the facts as alleged in light of
existing state law noting:
[T]here is no allegation that [the accounting firm] had any direct
dealings with the [creditor], had specifically agreed with [the
debtor] to prepare the report for the [creditor's] use or according
to the [creditor's] requirements, or had specifically agreed with
[the debtor] to provide [the creditor] with a copy or actually did
so. Indeed there is simply no allegation of any word or action on
the part of [the accounting firm] directed to [the creditor], of
anything contained in [the accounting firm's] agreement with the
[debtor] which provided the necessary link between [the account-
ing firm and the creditor].3
A number of other courts have followed this limited approach
to accountant liability to third-party users of financial statement
36. Id. at __, 483 N.E.2d at 118.
37. Id. at __, 483 N.E.2d at 118.
38. Id. at , 483 N.E.2d at 119.
39. Id. at ,483 N.E.2d at 119.
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information, ° none straying too far from the original privity of
contract argument advanced by Judge Cardozo fifty-seven years
ago.
B. The "Actually Foreseen" Standard and the Restatement of
Torts Section 552
In rec'ent years courts have begun to adopt the more liberal
view of the Restatement of Torts, section 552,"' as an alternative
to the narrow appproach of Ultramares and its progeny. Section
522 imposes liability for negligent misrepresentation on one who in
the course of his business, supplies false information for the guid-
ance of others in their business affairs when the information is jus-
tifiably relied upon by the user and this reliance gives rise to a
pecuniary loss.2 Section 522 limits liability in favor of those per-
sons "for whose benefit and guidance,"4 and in favor of losses suf-
40. See, e.g., Investment Corp. of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So.2d 505 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); See also MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199
S.E.2d 564 (1973) (Ultramares is the general rule); Stephens Industries, Inc. v.
Haskins and Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (accountant is not liable to a
known third-party user of the financial statements not in privity with the ac-
countant); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976)
(same); Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (accountant
not liable to the ultimate purchaser of a business); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d
1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (same).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1978). This section provides in
pertinent part:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transac-
tions, is subject to liabiltiy for pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) [T]he liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered,
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that
the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the in-
formation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a sub-
stantially similar transaction.
42. Id. at §552(1), See Comment, Adjusting Accounts' Liability For Negli-
gence: Recovery For Reasonably Foreseeable Users of Financial Statements, 13
U. BALT. L. REV. 301 (1984).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a).
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fered as a result of reliance upon the information in a transaction
that the provider "intends the information to influence as . . .in a
substantially similar transaction. 44
Early cases purporting to apply the Restatement (Second) the-
ory did so with a bent of uncertainty. One such early case is Rusch
Factors v. Levin.45 In Rusch, the court let a creditor sue the ac-
counting firm that audited the debtor's books beforethe debtor
went into receivership. 46 Adopting the end and aim analysis of
Glanzer, the court distinguished Ultramares by defining this par-
ticular plaintiff as a party whose reliance was actually foreseen by
the defendant.47 The Rusch Court equated the law in Glanzer with
the Restatement approach taken in the case at bar.48 Expanding
44. Id. § 552(2)(b).
45. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R. I. 1968).
46. Id. at 87.
47. Id. at 91. The Rusch plaintiff requested audited financial statements of
the debtor with which to gauge the debtor's financial condition. The debtor en-
gaged the accounting firm whose audited financial statements "represented the
[debtor] to be solvent by a substantial amount. In fact, the corporation was insol-
vent." Id. at 86. Of the relationship between the auditors and the plaintiff, the
court distinguished Ultramares noting:
"[In Ultramares] the plaintiff was member of an undefined, unlimited
class of remote lenders and potential equity holders not actually foreseen
but only foreseeable. Here the plaintiff is a single party whose reliance
was actually foreseen by the defendant."
Id. at 91.
48. Id. at 91-92. More specifically, the court purported to apply the Restate-
ment approach embodied in a tentative draft of section 552 as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transaction,
is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifia-
ble reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care
or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsec-
tion (1) is limited to loss suffered:
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information, or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends
the information to influence, or knows that the recipient so in-
tends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the infor-
mation extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose
benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is in-
tended to protect them.
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Glanzer, the court held that "[t]he defendant knew that his certifi-
cation was to be used for, and had as its very aim and purpose, the
reliance of potential [creditors] of the ... corporation." '49
That the court claimed to follow the Restatement approach,
yet retreated to the Glanzer "end and aim" analysis, raises two
interesting questions. First, would the result have been the same
had the court followed the strict Glanzer approach? Second, does
this retreat to Glanzer signal an inherent limitation in the Restate-
ment (Second) theory of liability?
To the extent that the auditor knew of the plaintiff-creditor at
the time of his work and that this plaintiff's use of the financial
statements was contemplated by all parties to the audit contract,
the plaintiffs use was the end and aim of the audit engagement.
While the Rusch Court noted that the Glanzer principle had been
effectively adopted by the Restatement," the court would not so
limit the scope of Restatement recovery. Instead, the Rusch Court
held that an "accountant should be liable in negligence for careless
financial misrepresentations relied upon by an actually foreseen
and limited class of persons."51 That Rusch represented the first
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, Comments and Explanatory Notes 13-16
(Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
49. Id. at 93. The court held:
"the wisdom on the decision in Ultramares has been doubted ... and
this court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliable party be
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional mal-
practice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread
by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of
insuring against the risk onto its customers who can in turn pass the cost
onto the entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeabil-
ity elevate the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession? For
these reasons it appears to this Court the decision in Ultramares consti-
tutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that the risk reasonably
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.
Id. at 90-91.
50. Id. at 93.
51. The Rusch analysis was at least facilitated, if not compelled, by the fol-
lowing commentary accompanying the tentative draft:
A is negotiating with a bank for a credit of $50,000. The bank requires an
audit by certified public accountants. A employs B & C Company, a firm
of accountants, to make the audit, telling them he is going to negotiate a
bank loan. A does not get his loan from the first bank but does negotiate
a loan with another bank, which relies upon B & C Company's certified
statements. The audit carelessly overstates the financial resources of A,
and in consequence the second bank suffers pecuniary loss. B & C Com-
pany is subject to liability to the second bank.
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meaningful departure from privity motions is undeniable. The
Rusch Court clearly followed the Glanzer rule, identifying the Re-
statement (Second) approach as the Glanzer approach applied to
accountants. 2 However, such analysis ignores the clear distinction
between the actual knowledge of an identified plaintiff required by
Glanzer and the specifically foreseen person standard used in the
Restatement (Second) approach.53 But as the auditor in Rusch
knew that he was engaged to prepare audited financial statements
to be used by his client, the Rusch result is justifiable by reference
to either the Glanzer or the Restatement (Second) approach."
C. The North Carolina Approach
On May 5, 1988, twenty-seven months after the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court adopted the approach embodied in Restatement (Sec-
ond) section 552 in Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert &
Rusch at 92, (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, Comments and
Explanatory Notes, 13-16, 23-25 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
52. Id. at 91.
53. See Comment, Accountant Liability to Third Parties: To What Extent
Is Comparative Negligence a Defense?, 55 UMKC L. REv. 608 (1987).
54. In Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969), the court purported to
follow the approach taken in Rusch, expressly adopting the Restatement position
respecting third-party liability. However, as the court held that the plaintiff was a
member of a group whose use was actually foreseen by the accountant at the time
of the audit, the gap between the Glanzer approach and that of the Restatement
was not completely filled. This was remedied, however, in Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.E.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). There the court expressly
adopted the Restatement approach, holding that an accountant could be held lia-
ble to all those whom he should reasonably expect to rely on his certification of
financial statements. Id. at 880.
The seemingly indiscriminate use of such language as "specifically foreseen,"
"actually foreseen," "reasonably foreseeable," and the like has prompted criticism
from one commentator:
Regardless of the clarity of the Restatement formulation, interpretation
of... Section [552] is sometimes obscured by misunderstandings of the
difference between the terms foreseen and foreseeable. Some opinions,
though accepting and applying the foreseen rule ... have misinterpreted
it insofar as they employ the word foreseeable or some derivative of that
term. Conversely, one opinion refers to auditors' "further duty to those
persons whom they can reasonably foresee will need to use and rely
upon" . . the audited financial statements .... 
See Gormley, supra note 18, at 530. Moreover, to the extent that each adjective
has its own definition, these expressions confuse rather than clarify, creating dis-
tinctions where none, in fact, exist.
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Holland 5 In Raritan, a creditor alleged negligent misrepresenta-
tion in the audit opinion of the then-bankrupt debtor.6 The credi-
tor did not allege either reliance on the financial statements them-
selves or that the auditor knew of the existence of the creditor or
his intended use of the statements.57 Instead, the creditor-plaintiff
alleged that:
(1) at the time [of the audit, the defendant] knew that such
financial statements would be used for, among other purposes,
general representations by the [debtor] of its financial condition,
and that extensions of credit to [the debtor] would be based on
such statements;
(2) that [the defendant] knew that it was customary and
foreseeable for the audited financial statement of [the debtor] to
be relied upon by creditors; and,
(3) that [the defendant] knew that it was customary and
foreseeable for audited financial statements to be widely circu-
lated to credit reporting agencies.s
Significant to this case is that the court of appeals allowed a cause
of action against the accountants without regard to the fact that
the plaintiffs did not allege reliance on the financial statement
themselves. Instead, the plaintiffs relied on a Dun & Bradstreet
credit report which contained an excerpt from the financial state-
ments showing a corporate "net worth" of approximately
$7,000,000. 59
The North Carolina Court of Appeals originally adopted a six-
factor public policy test as the standard to govern auditor's liabil-
ity to third parties.6 0 In adopting the six-factor test as the control-
55. 322 N.C. 200, 367 S.E.2d 609 (1988).
56. Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert and Holland, 79 N.C. App. 81,
339 S.E.2d 62 (1986).
57. Id. at 81, 339 S.E.2d at 62.
58. Sidbec-Dosco, Inc. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, Defendant-Appellees'
Brief before the North Carolina Court of Appeals, p. 2.
59. Raritan, 79 N.C. App. at 84, 339 S.E.2d at 65.
60. Id. at 91, 339 S.E.2d at 69; See also Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647,
320 P.2d 16 (1958); See infra, notes 112 to 113, and accompanying text. The es-
sence of this test is the analysis of the following factors as a requisite to imposing
liability on auditors:
Whether or not a party has placed himself in such a relation with an-
other that the law will impose on him an obligation, sounding in tort and
not in contract, to act in such a way that the other will not be injured
calls for the balancing of various factors: (1) the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the other person; (2) the foreseeability
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ling rule of law, the court rejected a reasonably foreseeable test"' as
being overbroad in its scope. The court noted:
[ejspecially in the field of accounting, ' it [is] necessary to adopt a
more restricted rule of liability [for pecuniary loss], because of
the extent to which misinformation may be, and may be expected
to be, circulated, and the magnitude of the losses which follow
from reliance upon it.' 62
Similarly, the court of appeals rejected the Restatement (Second)
approach as tending to arbitrarily define the class of plaintiffs enti-
tled to relief."3
The [six-factor] test, by contrast, avoids the necessity of an arbi-
trary, purpose-based determination of liability by allowing a court
to weigh the purpose of the audit as one of several determinative
factors. 4
There is little question but that the court of appeals greatly
expanded the notion of liability to third-party users of financial
statements far beyond that of its predecessors to consider the is-
of harm to him: (3) the degree of certainty that he suffered injury; (4) the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the in-
jury; (5) the moral blame attached to such conduct; and, (6) the policy
for preventing further harm.
Biakanja at __ , 320 P.2d at 19.
61. Id. at -, 320 P.2d at 19; See also H. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324,
461 A.2d 138 (1983); See infra notes 96 to 107 and accompanying text. This raises
the question of whether the reasonably foreseeable standard of Rosenblum differs
in application from the foreseeablity of harm standard of the six-factor test.
Clearly it does. The Rosenblum standard defines a permissible class of plaintiffs
in terms of whether a particular plaintiff's use of the statements was reasonably
foreseeable to the auditor. Under any analysis, it is difficult to imagine a situation
in which anyone doing business with a corporation, be they a shareholder, creditor
or potential buyer, would not be included in the group of users, reasonably fore-
seeable to the auditor. Contrary to this broad brush treatment, the six-factor test
will define the class of permissible plaintiffs in terms of both, intended use and
foreseeability of harm. Thus, the six-factor test should preclude recovery by a
person whose use is so remote from the purpose of the audit, that notwithstand-
ing any foreseeable degree of harm, the use could not have been contemplated by
the auditor.
62. Raritan, 79 N.C. App. at 84, 339 S.E.2d at 65, citing, RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND), OF TORTS, § 552, comment (a) (1977).
63. Id.
64. Id. For a discussion of expanding the liability of accountants to third-
party users of financial information, in light of the six-factor test, See Besser,
Privity-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties,
7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507 (1976).
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sue. However, even a cursory reading of the opinion highlights its
glaringly deficient analysis. This deficiency becomes apparent
when considered in light of the fact that the court cites the holding
of Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co.,65 in support of its
expansionist posture, yet ignores the factual underpinnings which
based liability on the accountants only where they knew of the
plaintiff's use of their report.6
Thus, the North Carolina Court of Appeals laid bare a land-
scape of legal precedent, littered with confusion and the jagged
outcroppings of unrefined analysis. It was against this backdrop
that the North Carolina Supreme Court undertook the matter and
adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second) section 552.7
65. Raritan, 79 N.C. App. at 90, 339 S.E.2d at 68 (citing Aluma Kraft Mfg.
Co. v. Elmer, 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)). This case upheld the use of
the six-factor test in light of evidence that the accountant knew the intended use
of the audited financial statements.
66. The North Carolina courts have applied the six-factor test a number of
times to allow a third party, not in privity of contract with a professional, to bring
an action for negligence against attorneys. See Ingle v. Allen, 71 N.C. App. 20, 321
S.E.2d 588 (1984); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69 N.C.App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 354, dis. rev.
denied, 311 N.C. 758, 321 S.E.2d 136 (1984); United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45
N.C. App. 400, 263 S.E.2d 313, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685
(1980).
It is here that the analytical deficiencies in the court of appeals' reasoning
become apparent. The court cites these North Carolina cases in support of the
proposition that the six-factor test as applied to other professions should be ex-
tended to the accounting profession in the instant case. However this ignores the
underlying factual settings in these cases, which are easily distinguished from the
case at bar. In United Leasing Corp., the court allowed an equipment lessor to
bring action against the attorney whose negligently prepared title opinion, as pre-
pared by the attorney and delivered to the lessor by the attorney, caused the loss
to the lessor. United Leasing Corp., 45 N.C.App. at 407, 263 S.E.2d at 316. In
Jenkins, the court allowed the sole beneficiary of an estate to bring an action
against the representing attorney for failing to inform the administratrix of her
available cause of action for the wrongful death of the decedent. At the time of
the engagement of the attorney, the attorney knew the plaintiff and knew that the
plaintiff was the sole beneficiary of the estate. Jenkins, 69 N.C. App. 141-142, 316
S.E.2d at 356.
As both of these cases represent instances where the defendant knew the
plaintiff at the time of the engagement, neither supports the proposition for
which the court of appeals cites them; that being, that a third-party user of the
accountant's information work product, where it is neither alleged that the pro-
fessional-defendant knew the plaintiff at the time of the engagement nor that the
plaintiff directly relied on the work product of the professional to his detriment,
may hold the accountant liable for audit negligence.
67. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 200, 367 S.E.2d at 609.
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In Raritan, the supreme court undertook an analysis of the consol-
idated claims of two creditors of Intercontinental Metals Corpora-
tion (IMC), the Raritan River Steel Company and Sidbec-Dosco,
Inc.6 8 The plaintiffs allegedly extended credit to IMC on the basis
of what they contend was an incorrect overstatement of the com-
pany's net worth, as reflected in the audit report prepared by the
defendants. 9 Critical to understanding this case, however, is an
analysis of the complaints filed by the separate plaintiffs. Whereas
Sidbec-Dosco alleged reliance on IMC's audited financial state-
ments, 70 Raritan did not allege reliance on these financial state-
ments. Instead, Raritan alleged that it relied on a Dun & Brad-
street credit report which indicated that IMC had a net worth of
roughly $7,000,000.71 Each of these claims were dismissed in the
68. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 203, 367 S.E.2d at 611 [hereinafter "IMC,"
"Raritan" and "Sidbec-Dosco" respectively].
69. Id.
70. Id. at 207, 367, S.E.2d at 613. Sidbec-Dosco alleged in relevant part:
17. That based upon financial information showing substantial net worth
of IMC, the Plaintiff extended substantial unsecured credit to IMC dur-
ing 1982.... 24. That the Plaintiff has incurred substantial expenses and
damages as a direct result of its extension of credit to IMC and IMTC in
reliance on the reported financial condition of these entities.
Id. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613.
71. Id. at 205, 367 S.E.2d at 612. Raritan alleged in relevant part:
4. Defendant Cherry Bekaert was engaged pursuant to a valid and en-
forceable contract, to examine the financial statements of Intercontinen-
tal Metals Corporation, Intercontinental Metal Trading Corporation and
other related companies (collectively hereafter "IMC") as of September
30, 1981 and September 30, 1980, in accordance with Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards and to express an opinion as to whether or not such
financial statements presented fairly the financial position of IMC and
the results of its operations and changes in its financial position for the
years ending September 30, 1980 and September 30, 1981. Defendant
Cherry Bekaert published its Report of Certified Public Accountants,
Consolidated Financial Statements. Years ended September 30, 1981 and
1980 on or about January 30, 1982.... 6. Plaintiff had over a period of
y~ars sold hot-rolled carbon wire rod (raw steel) to IMC on open account,
relying on information available to plaintiff with respect to the financial
condition of IMC.
7. Subsequent to May 6, 1982, IMC placed orders for hot-rolled carbon
wire rod (raw steel) with plaintiff in substantial amounts. Plaintiff's in-
quiry with respect to the current financial polition of IMC on or about
May 6, 1982, included a report from Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. showing
IMC's audited net worth as of September 30, 1981, to be $6,964,475.00.
The Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., report made specific reference to defendant
Cherry Bekaert's Report of Certified Public Accountants as the source of
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trial court.72 However, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's determination on the issue of negligent misrepresentation. 73
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' determination
with respect to that of Sidbec-Dosco.
7
'
The supreme court focused on two questions of first impres-
sion.75 First whether plaintiffs "who have relied on financial infor-
mation in an accountant's audit report must demonstrate that they
obtained the information from the actual report itself."' 76 The
court held that "a party cannot show justifiable reliance on infor-
mation contained in audited financial statements without showing
that he relied upon the actual financial statements themselves to
obtain this information."' 77 To the extent that Raritan alleged reli-
information contained in its report.
8. In reliance upon information contained in the Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
report, as supplied by defendant Cherry Bekaert's Report of Certified
Public Accountants, plaintiff extended credit to IMC in excess of
$42,247,844.61.
Id. at 204-5, 367 S.E2d at 611-12.
72. Id. at 204, 367 S.E.2d at 611.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 203, 367 S.E.2d at 611. The Raritan Court noted:
Interesting questions of first impression are presented. The first deals
with whether plaintiffs who have relied on financial information in an
accountant's audit report must demonstrate that they obtained the infor-
mation from the actual report itself. We conclude that they must. The
second question involves the scope of an accountant's liability to persons
other than the client for whom the audit report was prepared. We con-
clude that the scope of liability is best measured by the approach set out
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (9177).
Id. at 203, 367 S.E.2d at 611.
76. Id. at 203, 367 S.E.2d at 611.
77. Id. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 612. The court however acknowledged the poten-
tial for liability without reliance, referring to the case of H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); See infra notes 96 to 107 and accompany-
ing text. However, the Raritan Court noted the limitation inherent in Rosenblum,
also in favor of foreseeable users of financial information:
The principle that we have adopted applies by its terms only to those
foreseeable users who receive the audited statements from the business
entity for a proper business purpose to influence a business decision of
the user, the audit having been made for that business entity. Thus, for
example, an institutional investor or portfolio manager who does not ob-
tain audited statements from the company would not come within the
stated principle.
Raritan, 322 N.C. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 612-13 (citing Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352-
53, 461 A.2d at 153). See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Account-
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ance, not on the financial statements themselves, but on excerpted
information contained in a Dun & Bradstreet report, Raritan did
not plead reliance sufficient to maintain a claim against the ac-
counting firm."8 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the lower
court's determination and affirmed that of the trial court, dis-
missing Raritan's complaint against the accounting firm.79 Because
Sidbec-Dosco alleged reliance on the financial statements, the
court undertook to determine the proper standard of liability to be
applied against the accounting firm with respect to Sidbec-Dosco's
allegations."0
In opting in favor of the Restatement (Second) approach, the
Raritan Court examined all four of the prevailing theories of liabil-
ity currently followed by the courts of various states. The court
specifically rejected the Ultramares privity approach because "it
provides inadequately for the central role independent accountants
play in the financial world. Accountants' audit opinions are in-
creasingly relied upon by the investing and lending public in mak-
ancy Corp, 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
78. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613. The court noted:
Our holding that reliance on the audited financial statements is required
in these kinds of cases stems in part from an understanding of the audit
report. An audit report represents the auditor's opinion of the accuracy
of the client's financial statements at a given period of time. The finan-
cial statements themselves are the representations of management, not
the auditor. Isolated statements in the report, particularly the net worth
figure, do not meaningfully stand alone; rather, they are interdependent
and can be fully understood and justifiably relied on only when consid-
ered in the context of the entire report, including any qualifications of
the auditor's opinion and any explanatory footnotes included in the
statements.
Id. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613.
80. Id. at 207-8, 367 S.E.2d at 613. The court noted:
Because Sidbec-Dosco does not allege that it relied on sources other than
the audited financial statements it has not pleaded facts which defeat its
claim and its complaint is not dismissible on this ground. Under the lib-
eral rules of notice pleading Sidbec-Dosco's complaint may not be dis-
missed unless it appears to a certainty that Sidbec-Dosco is not entitled
to relief under any 'state of facts.' Under its pleading Sidbec-Dosco may
be able to prove at trial that it did indeed rely on the audit report pre-
pared by defendants.
The more difficult question raised by Sidbec-Dosco's complaint is
whether it alleges enough to show that defendants owed a duty of care.
Id. (citations omitted).
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ing financial decisions." '81 Because of this heavy public reliance on
audited financial information, the court held that "an approach
that protects those persons, or classes of persons, whom an ac-
countant knows will rely on his audit opinion, but who may not
otherwise be in 'privity or near privity' with him is desirable." ' 2
Moreover, the court specifically declined to adopt a more liberal
standard, which would otherwise extend an accountant's liability
to all "reasonably foreseeable" foreseen users of financial informa-
tion.83 While this "reasonably foreseeable" standard had some in-
herent appeal, the court noted that its origins in products liability
law made it particularly inadequate to comprehend the duties of
an accountant with respect to a third-party user of financial infor-
mation.8 4 Because auditors have little control over the distribution
of their reports and because they must necessarily rely on their
clients' financial records as a basis for forming an opinion, the
"reasonably foreseeable" standard imposes too great a threshold of
liability on the accounting profession.85
81. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 212-213, 367 S.E.2d at 616. The court continued:
A more fundamental difference between product designers and manufac-
turers and accountants lies in their differing expectations concerning
their work product. Manufacturers and designers fully expect that their
products will be used by a wide variety of unknown members of the pub-
lic. Indeed, this is their hope, for with wider use will come increased
profits. This is not the case when an accountant prepares an audit. An
accountant performs an audit pursuant to a contract with an individual
client. The client may or may not intend to use the report for other than
internal purpsoes. It does not benefit the accountant if his client distrib-
utes the audit opinion to others. Instead, it merely exposes his work to
many whom he may have had no idea would scrutinize his efforts. We
believe that in fairness accountants should not be liable in circumstances
where they are unaware of the use to which their opinions will be put.
Instead, their liability should be commensurate with those persons or
classes of persons whom they know will rely on their work. With such
knnowledge the auditor can, through purchase of liability insurance, set-
ting fees, and adopting other protective measures appropriate to the risk,
prepare accordingly.
Id. at 213, 367 S.E.2d at 616.
85. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 213, 367 S.E.2d at 616.
Between the production and distribution of an accountant's audit report
and the design and manufacture of a product we perceive significant dif-
ferences which justify establishing a narrower class of plaintiffs to whom
the accountant owes a duty of care. Designers and manufacturers have
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The Raritan Court also specifically rejected the six-factor test
adopted by the court of appeals.8 6 The court noted that the six-
factor test:
requires that the 'moral blame' of the defendant and the 'policy
of preventing future harm' be considered in determining whether
the defendant should be held liable. These factors are not capable
of precise application and seem to add little to an assessment of
whether a defendant violated a particular duty of care."7
The court held that the standard set forth in the Restatement
(Second) approach:
represents the soundest approach to accountants' liability for
negligent misrepresentation. It constitutes a middle ground be-
tween the restrictive Ultramares approach advocated by the de-
fendants and the expansive 'reasonably foreseeable' approach ad-
vanced by plaintiffs. It recognizes that liability should extend not
only to those with whom the accountant is in privity or near priv-
ity, but also to those persons, or classes of persons, with whom he
knows and intends will rely on his opinion, or whom he knows his
client intends will so rely. On the other hand, . .. it prevents
extension of liability in situations where the accountant 'merely
knows of the ever-present possibility of repetition to anyone, and
the possibility of action in reliance upon [the audited financial
statements], on the part of anyone to whom it may be repeated.'88
control over the processes by which the products enter the stream of
commerce. Manufacturers, and to a lesser extent designers, can limit
their potential liability by controlling the number of products they re-
lease into the marketplace. Auditors, on the other hand, have no control
over the distrubution of their reports, and hence lack control over their
exposure to liability. Moreover, as noted previously, auditors do not con-
trol their client's accounting records and processes. While in the final
analysis, an auditor renders an opinion concerning the accuracy of his
client's records, he necessarily relies, in some measure, on the client for
the records' contents. Because of the accountant's inability to control the
distribution of his report, as well as his lack of control over some of the
contents of the statements he assesses, a standard which limits his poten-
tial liability is appropriate.
Id. at 212-13, 367 S.E.2d at 616 (citations omitted).
86. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617.
87. Id. "Furthermore, the Biakanja test approximates a 'reasonable foresee-
ability' test. One of the factors in the test is 'the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff ... [W]e decline to adopt a standard which would extend accountant's
liability to all reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs." Id.
88. Id. at 214-15, 367 S.E.2d at 617. "As such it balances, more so than other
standards, the need to hold accountants to a standard that accounts for their con-
[Vol. 11:123150
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/2
AUDITOR NEGLIGENCE
As to the practical application of the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach, the court held that:
under the Restatement approach an accountant who audits or
prepares financial information for a client owes a duty of care not
only to the client but to any other person, or one of a group of
persons, with whom the accountant or his client intends the infor-
mation to benefit; and that the person reasonably relies on the
information in a transaction, or one substantially similar to it,
that the accountant or his client intends the information to influ-
ence. If the requisite intent is that of the client and not the ac-
countant, then the accountant must know of his client's intent at
the time the accountant audits or prepares the information."9
Thus, the court recognizes the dual nature of the Restatement
(Second) approach. First, the court recognizes that the Restate-
ment (Second) approach defines a class of persons to whom the
accountant or his client intends the information to benefit. Second,
the court also recognizes the transactional nature of the Restate-
ment (Second) approach. Notwithstanding that a third-party user
is an intended user of financial information, under the Restate-
ment (Second) approach, the user must rely on the information "in
a transaction, or one substantially similar to it, that the accountant
or his client intends the information to influence." 90
The transactional element of the Restatement (Second) cal-
culus merits brief consideration in this case. Because this element
implicates the accountant-client relationship, the identity of the
client is paramount to imposing liability against the accountant.
To the extent that the audit client is typically the corporation
under review, it is this client's use of financial information that
should determine the auditor's extent of liability therefor. Clearly,
corporate creditors and shareholder investors are the intended
users of this financial information in most cases. But what of the
cases involving small or closely held corporations? If a sole share-
holder of a closely held corporation uses his audited financial
statements to obtain personal credit, does this individual creditor
have recourse against the accountant in the event that the ac-
countant was negligent in performing his audit responsibilities? Or
temporary role in the financial world with the need to protect them from liability
that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking. Id. at 215, 367
S.E.2d at 617.
89. Id. at 210, 367 S.E.2d at 614.
90. Id.
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must the accountant know that the shareholder will use this infor-
mation to verify his personal wealth as a prerequisite to obtaining
such credit? The Raritan interpretation of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) approach seems to blur this distinction by making reference
to the auditor's knowledge of the intended use of his report:
The Restatement (Second) approach does not demand that the
accountant be informed by the client himself of the audit report's
intended use. [The Restatement (Second) approach] requires only
that the auditor know that his client intends to supply informa-
tion to another person or limited group of persons. Whether the
auditor acqgires this knowledge from his client or elsewhere
should be make no difference. If he knows at the time he prepares
his report that the specific persons, or a limited group of persons,
will rely on his work, and intends or knows that his client intends
such reliance, his duty of care should extend to them. 1
Accordingly, the supreme court upheld Sidbec-Dosco's complaint
on the grounds that the creditor stated a legally sufficient claim
against the defendants for negligent misrepresentation.2 Sidbec-
Docso alleged that "when the defendants prepared the audited fi-
nancial statements for IMC they knew: first, the statements would
be used by IMC to represent its financial condition to creditors
who would extend credit on the basis of them; and second, plaintiff
and other creditors would rely on the statements. These allegations
are sufficient to impose upon defendants a duty of care to Sidbec-
Dosco under the Restatement approach . ..
The Restatement (Second) approach continues to be widely
followed as the rule respecting third-party liability." In recent
91. Raritan, 322 N.C. at 215, 367 S.E.2d at 618.
92. Id. at 216, 367 S.E.2d at 618.
93. Id.
94. The court has, on occasion, expanded the scope of third-party users of
financial information under the Restatement approach. In Merit Insurance Co. v.
Caleo, 603 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1979), the court held that an insurance company was
among the foreseeable class of users of an insurance agent's financial statements.
Id. at 658-59. In another case involving an insurance company, the court stretched
the foreseen user notion of liability to a ridiculous extreme. In Bonhiver v. Graff,
248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976), the court held that the general agents of an insur-
ance company were among the class of users whose use was reasonably foreseen
by the auditors. However, the court's reasoning was based on the stair-step rea-
soning which first requires the assumption that the state insurance commissioner
was an agent of the general agents and that the direct reliance of the commis-
sioner on the financial information is imputed to the general agents. Id. at 299-
301.
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years, motivated by compelling notions of public policy, courts
have begun to expand the scope of accountant liability95 beyond
that of either the Primary Benefit or Restatement (Second) rules.
D. The "Reasonably Foreseeable" Standard
On occasion courts have been willing to enlarge the scope of
auditor liability to the fullest limits of reason. Far beyond Ul-
tramares and the Restatement (Second) standards of liability lie
the liberal New Jersey and Wisconsin rulings in H. Rosenblum v.
Adler96 and Citizens State Bank v. Timm.
9 7
The Rosenblum Court allowed shareholders of a publicly
traded corporation to bring an action for the negligent perform-
ance of the auditor's duties to the corporation. In Rosenblum,
plaintiffs acquired stock in Giant Stores Corporation ("Giant") in
conjunction with the sale of plaintiff's business to Giant. Giant
provided financial statements to plaintiffs during the merger dis-
cussions, which formed the basis for valuing the transaction. Plain-
tiffs sued Giant's corporate auditors when the financial statements
were discovered to be fraudulent and the Giant stock to be
worthless. 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the nature of the
auditor's work, concluding that the use of financial statements by
third parties is now a matter of common knowledge. Analogizing
to a product liability theory of recovery,"' the court noted that
[t]he fundamental issue is whether there should be any duty to
respond in damages for economic loss owed to a foreseeable user
neither in privity with the [accountant] or intended by the [ac-
See Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436
N.E.2d 212 (1982); Comment, Third Party Liability for Negligence - The Ac-
countant's Price For Producing A Reliable Commodity: Haddon View Invest-
ment Company v. Cooper & Lybrand, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1371 (1983).
95. "Why the development of the common law of accountant's liability has
proceeded so cautiously, in what is almost universally perceived to be an activist
judicial world, is inexplicable." Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certified
Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 233,
249 (1983).
96. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
97. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
98. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at -, 461 A.2d at 140-141.
99. Id. at _ ,461 A.2d at 149.
100. Id. at __,461 A.2d 146-47.
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countant] to be the user of his statement or opinion.'
The court then turned to a discussion of the relative fairness
of holding the accountant liable to a foreseeable user of the audit
report. The court phrased its inquiry by noting:
[tihere remains to be considered whether the public interest will
be served by a proposition holding an auditor responsible for neg-
ligence to those persons who the auditor should reasonably fore-
see will be given the audit to rely upon and do in fact place such
reliance to their detriment. Should there by such a duty? 02
To this, the court held that the fundamental question was one of
fairness. This inquiry involves a "weighing of the relationship of
the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the
proposed solution." 103 To the extent that the auditor can reduce
his risk of liability through more thorough audit procedures as well
as through malpractice insurance, 04 the auditor remains the party
101. Id. at __, 461 A.2d at 147.
102. Id.
103. Id. at _ , 461 A.2d 138, 147 (1983). The Rosenblum court then dis-
cussed several factors relevant to its determination of liability including:
[T]he burden [that the suggested duty] would put on defendant's activ-
ity; the extent to which the risk is one normally incident to that activity;
the risk and the burden to [the] plaintiff; the respective availability and
cost of insurance to the two parties; the prevalence of insurance in fact;
the desirability and effectiveness of putting the pressure to insure on one
rather than the other, and the like.
Id.
104. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. For an excellent discussion of some practical
problems which inhere in an auditors attempts to reduce his risk of liability, see
Weiner supra note 95. Among other problems, the Commentator accurately sum-
marizes some problems attendant to professional liability insurance:
Professional liability insurance does not appear to offer a viable damages
solution to accountants. Because of the increased litigation to which ac-
countants are exposed, the premiums of such coverage have become so
costly as to necessitate either large deductibles or even self-insurance.
Even if accountants could afford to acquire such coverage, policies have
not been standardized and vary greatly.
The very nature of the accounting profession causes other problems with
insurance. One such problem is determining proximate cause, especially
when the accountant/client relationship has existed over an extended pe-
riod of time. The problem of determining the specific occurrence which
gave rise to a pecuniary loss is important because of the way it affects the
amount of coverage. Id. at 538-29 ....
A further problem is posed by punitive damages. Punitive damages will
not always be covered by professional liability insurance. The conflict
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best postured to bear the risk of his negligence.
When the independent auditor furnishes an opinion with no limi-
tation in the certificate as to whom the company may disseminate
the financial statements, he has a duty to all those whom that
auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients from the company
of the statements for its proper business purposes, provided that
the recipients rely on the statements pursuant to those business
purposes.'0 5
Thus, the court held that the underlying policies of protecting the
user who relies on the information in financial statements and
holding the profession accountable for the quality of their work
product are best served by allowing recovery for negligent audit
performance by all whose use is reasonably foreseeable to the ac-
countant. 1' The court stated:
Certified financial statements have become the benchmark for va-
rious reasonably foreseeable business purposes and accountants
have been engaged to satisfy those ends. In those circumstances,
accounting firms should no longer be permitted to hide within the
citadel of privity and avoid liability for their malpractice. The
public interest will be served by the rule we promulgate this
day. 
07
In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,' 0 8 the Wis-
consin bench came out in favor of a similar scope of liability, not-
ing that "unless liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon
here is one of public policy. If punitive damages by definition are meant
to punish and therefore deter, it can be argued that to have such dam-
ages covered by insurance deters the basic purpose of the damages. Id. at
536-37.
See Weiner, supra note 95, at 1936, n. 173 (citations omitted).
105. Rosenblum, 93 N. J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
106. Id. The Rosenblum Court did, however, suggest several factors which
will militate against unlimited liability. First, the third party must receive the
financial statement from the company pursuant to a property company purpose.
Second, the plaintiff must reasonably rely on the financial statements. Third, the
misstatement in the financial statement must result from the auditor's negligence
and must be the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. Fourth, the plaintiff's
own negligence could bar or limit recovery. Last, when the accountant's client
contributes to the misstatement and the resulting loss, the accountant may seek
indemnification or contribution from the client company.
Id. at 350-351, 461 A.2d at 152.
107. Id. at 350-351, 461 A2d at 153.
108. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361.
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the accuracy of the financial statements will not be protected."10 9
However, the court did not favor unlimited liability in all circum-
stances. "Liability will be imposed on those accountants for the
foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent acts unless ... as
a matter of policy to be decided by the court, recovery is denied on
the grounds of public policy." 10 Of the policy justifications for not
imposing liability on the accountants, the court noted the
following:
(1) [t]he injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the in-
jury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the [de-
fendant]; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary
that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4)
because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a
burden on the [defendant]; or (5) because allowance of recovery
would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6)
allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or
just stopping point."'
These decisions support the proposition that an accountant
may be held liable to any person whose use of the financial infor-
mation is reasonably foreseeable to the accountant. When consid-
ered in an analytical vacuum, these decisions appear harsh in that
their effect extends far beyond the scope of the ordinary account-
ant client relationship. However, this extension is easier to accept
when considered in light of the purpose of the audit and the use of
the audited financial statements. Inherent in the notion of auditing
the information of another is the presumption that the audited in-
formation will be read and relied upon, at least to a limited extent,
by a third party. The question addressed by the courts analyzing
this relationship of reliance involves determining who has a legal
right to rely on the information. The Rosenblum Court answers
"everyone!" The court thus recognizes the practical limitations
which inhere in any decision making process. There simply must
come a point where one should be allowed to rely on the declara-
tions of another, especially when the declarant is an expert in his
field. To preclude another from relying on this expert's opinion is
tantamount to allowing the auditor to say that "the audited finan-
cial statements, to which our opinion is attached, present fairly the
financial position of ABC Corporation, but don't take our word for
109. Id. at __, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
110. Id. at __, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
111. Id. at , 335 N.W.2d at 366.
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it."
E. The Six-Factor Test
In recent years, another expansive theory of tort liability has
emerged from the morass of decisions. This is the six-factor bal-
ancing test of Biakanja v. Irving.1 2 In Biakanja, the sole benefi-
ciary of an estate brought an action against a notary public,
through whose negligence the will was denied probate. In allowing
the beneficiary to maintain an action against the notary, the court
adopted a six-factor test, expanding the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach to include an analysis of relevant policy considerations:
Whether or not a party has placed himself in such a relation with
another that the law will impose on him an obligation, sounding
in tort and not in contract, to act in such a way that the other will
not be injured calls for the balancing of various factors: (1) the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the other
person; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of
certainty that he suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connec-
tion between the defendant's conduct and the injury; (5) the
moral blame attached to such conduct; and, (6) the policy of
preventing further harm.'
Several courts have addressed the applicability of the six-fac-
tor test in cases involving accountants. In Alum Kraft Mfg. Co. v.
Elmer Fox & Co.," 4 the court allowed the buyer of a business who
relied on the audited financial statements in determining the
purchase price to bring an action against the accountant for the
negligent preparation of the statement. 1 5 The court focused on the
allegation that the "auditors knew that the said audit was being
prepared for the purpose of determining the amounts which the
plainfiff. . . would pay ... and that the plaintiff.. . would rely
upon the [report].""' The court expressly rejected the requirement
of privity as a prerequisite to tort recovery. The court carefully
distinguished between the Ultramares reasoning, that being that
the audit services are only of incidental or collateral benefit to the
users of the statements, and the instant case. The court denied ef-
fect to the privity analysis where the evidence clearly demon-
112. 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
113. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
114. 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 383.
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strated that audit services were performed for the benefit of a class
of potential buyers stating:
Our rejection of the requirement of the strict rule of privity...
comports with the concepts of the functions and duties of the
modern [certified] public accountant, the purpose of a modern
audit and is consistent with the development of the liability of an
accountant under the securities laws and is consistent with the
recent development in England where the doctrine of privity was
born.117
The Aluma Kraft Court, while expanding the scope of accountant
liability beyond arcane principles of privity, still relied on the fact
that both the existence and identity of the purchaser were known
to the accountant at the time of his engagement. Later cases fol-
lowing this line of reasoning have similarly held in favor of recov-
ery where it is shown that the accountant knew of the existence of
the plaintiff at the time of the audit. In Tiffany Indus. v. Harbor
Ins. Co.," 8 the court upheld recovery by an indemnity insurance
company, against the auditors as third-party defendants, where it
could be shown that the financial statement was prepared for the
benefit of the insurer and that the accountant knew that the in-
surer would use the statement at the time of the audit.119 Simi-
larly, the court in 999 v. Cox & Co.,12' upheld the applicability of
the six-factor test where it is alleged that the defendant-account-
ant "knows that the recipient of the audit intends to supply [the
statements] to a limited class of persons .... 121
At first blush, this test smacks of the Restatement (Second)
approach in that it purports to limit recovery to a class of plaintiffs
whose use and reliance on the statements is foreseen by the ac-
countants at the time of the audit. However, several fundamental
differences become apparent upon closer scrutiny. Liability under
the Restatement (Second) approach depends in large part on a de-
termination of whether the plaintiff was a member of a group of
persons actually foreseen by the auditor as relying on the financial
statements. This limitation is born of the language of section 552
itsel f 2 which limits liability in favor of a "person as one of a lim-
117. Id. at 383-84.
118. 536 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
119. Id. at 434.
120. 574 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
121. Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 552 (1987).
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ited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the account-
ant] intends to supply the information or knows that [his client]
intends to supply it . "..."123 Thus, the class of plaintiffs entitled to
recover under the Restatement (Second) approach is determined
by the extent of the auditor's knowledge of their existence. If the
auditor actually foresees their use, the plaintiffs are entitled to
recovery.
The six-factor test, on the other hand, enlarges the scope of
permissible plaintiffs to include those, although not actually fore-
seen by the auditor, whose pecuniary loss was nonetheless foresee-
able in light of the existing circumstances. Thus, liability under the
six-factor test is based on the subjective inquiry of foreseeability of
harm. Whereas the Restatement (Second) approach is the more
objective approach, focusing not on what is foreseeable but on
what was actually foreseen by the auditor.
This distinction becomes apparent when considered in light of
the result in Aluma Kraft.124 The Aluma Kraft Court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover, based on evidence that the audi-
tors knew they would rely on the financial statements in forming
their investment decision.1 5 As the auditors actually knew of the
plaintiff's use, the plaintiffs were necessarily members of the lim-
ited group of users defined by objective inquiry. By extension, as
they were well within the parameters of this limited group of
plaintiffs, they were also within the broader group of plaintiffs con-
templated by the subjective standard. Applying either the subjec-
tive or objective approach, the result will be the same. Under ei-
ther analysis, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. However,
assume for the moment that the auditors did not know of any pro-
spective buyers for the business. Assume, instead, that the auditors
only knew that their clients were considering a sale of their busi-
ness at an undetermined date in the future, but as yet, their clients
had no prospective purchasers. Under these modified facts, the
buyers may be denied recovery under the Restatement (Second)
approach. Any objective inquiry would force the conclusion that
the buyers were not within the group of persons whose use of the
statements was actually foreseen by the auditors at the audit date.
However under the subjective, six-factor test, the courts can con-
sider whether the harm suffered by the buyers foreseeably resulted
123. Id. at § 552(2)(a).
124. 493 S.W.2d at 378.
125. Id. at 383.
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from the auditor's negligence. Where, as in Aluma Kraft,1 26 the fi-
nancial statements present information essential to negotiating the
purchase price of the business, the buyer's loss may have
foreseeably resulted from the misstated information. Thus, the
subjective standard of foreseeability will operate to allow recovery,
whereas the objective approach will deny relief, under the same set
of facts.
The "actually foreseen" standard places a limitation on the
class of persons entitled to recover when the auditor is negligent.
The law makes a distincition between persons who rely on financial
statements where in practicality none exists. To be sure, a creditor,
unknown to an auditor at the time of his engagement, will not rely
less on a set of audited financial statements than a creditor who is
known by the auditor. The six-factor test avoids this distinction by
speaking in terms of foreseeability of injury.
Subsumed within the questions of whether and to whom an
auditor should be held liable for his negligence are pressing ques-
tions of policy not addressed by many courts. These questions con-
cern the extent to which public policy demands greater profes-
sional responsibility and whether these policy goals should be
furthered by heightened social responsibility.
IV. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE AUDIT
Inherent in the proposition that "[while] the purpose of a par-
ticular audit may be relevant to foreseeability, it should not be ex-
clusively determinative," '127 is the notion that the courts will, on
occasion, extend the liability of an accountant beyond that encom-
passed by the scope of a regular audit. 128 An auditor performs a
126. Id. at 378.
127. Raritan, 79 N.C. App. at 91, 339 S.E.2d at 69.
128. The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the
independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which
they present financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial po-
sition in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Professional
Standards No. 1 § 110.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1987). This
objective is typically referred to as the "attest" function, as it describes the nature
of the auditor's work. P. DEFLIESE, K. JOHNSON, AND R. MACCLEOUD, MONTGOM-
ERY'S AUDITING, (9th ed. 1975).
Mangagement has the responsibility for adopting sound accounting poli-
cies, for maintaining an adequate and effective system of accounts, for
the safeguarding of assets, and for devising a system of internal control
that will, among other things, help assure the production of proper finan-
cial statements .... The independent auditor may make suggestions as
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service for several parties, whose interests in the information may
conflict. The financial statements are used by management to re-
present the financial position of the corporation. Management in-
tends that third parties, such as creditors and investors, rely on the
information therein as a basis for doing business with the corpora-
tion.'29 In this situation, the auditor is bound in a way that no
other profession obligates its members. He must perform services
under the contract with the audit client while maintaining the re-
quired objectivity such that his work does not unfairly favor either
the interests of his client or those of any later user of the informa-
tion.130 It is here that the conflict between the scope of the contrac-
to the form or content of the financial statements or he may draft them
in whole or part, based on management's accounts and records. However,
his responsibility for the statements he has examined is confined to the
expression of his opinion on them. The financial statements remain the
representations of management.
Professional Standards No. 1, § 110.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1987).
129. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at , 461 A.2d at 150.
130. The strength of the public confidence in the role of the auditor, as the
impartial guardian of the investor's interests, is founded on his relationship of
independence from his client. "Public confidence would be impaired by evidence
that independence was actually lacking, and it might also be impaired by the exis-
tence of circumstances which reasonable people might believe likely to influence
independence. To be independent, the auditor must be intellectually honest; to be
recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation to or interest in
the client, its management, or its owners." Professional Standards 1, § 220.03. "In
all matters relating to the assignment, an independence and mental attitude is to
be maintained by the auditor or auditors." Professional Standards No. 1, § 220.01
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1987).
Independence is a foremost consideration of all audit practitioners. Most ac-
counting firms have procedures for determining conflicts respecting independence
which, if they exist, would necessarily emasculate the meaningfulness of any opin-
ion on the financial statements. In cases where an auditor is not independent, the
represenation is the audit opinion, that the audit was performed in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, is by definition a false statement. For
an interesting discussion respecting the lack of independence of a cause of action
against accountants, See, Comment, Failure to Maintain Independence: A Pro-
posed Cause of Action Against Accountants, 62 TEx. L. REv. 923 (1984). In Asso-
ciated Gas and Electric Co., 11 S.E.C. 975 (1942), the S.E.C. held that when an
accountant "consistently submerges his preference or convictions as to accounting
principles to the wishes to his client [he] is not in fact independent." Id. at 1047.
This holding recognizes that there must be an attitude of openess and willingness,
between the accountant and his audit client. However, the auditor must be mind-
ful of the potential of his willingness to deal with his client, especially in light of
the nature of the relationship between auditor and the fee payment client, as this
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tual relationship between the auditor and his client and the grow-
ing trend of accountant liability becomes apparent:
It is widely, but mistakenly, believed that financial statements are
issued by the auditor as his responsibility; that the auditor should
prove the correctness of the numbers as a matter of mathematics;
that the auditor represents that the numbers (and only those
numbers) are 'accurate;' [and] that the auditor should be able to
detect any irregularity and concealment .... From this flows the
erroneous legal supposition that his responsibility should be
coxtensive with that of the client.13
Rather, the function of the auditor's opinion is to lend credibility
to management's representations. This function is becoming in-
creasingly difficult in light of the potential for client-perpetrated
fraud and malfeasance and the potential for economic failure of
the business."3 2 Arguably the auditor's professional responsibility
requires him to reach beyond the parameters of his audit contract.
The duality of the auditor's role in the business community de-
has the potential to create problems with the requirement of independence.
131. See supra, note 6, at 1.23. The position of the AICPA, respecting the
distinction between the responsibilities of the auditor and the client is as follows:
Management has the responsibility for adopting such accounting policies,
for maintaining an adequate and effective system of accounts, for the
safeguarding of assets, and for devising a system of internal control that
will, among other things, help assure the production of proper financial
statements. The transactions which should be reflected in the accounts
and in the financial statements are matters within the direct knowledge
and control of management. The auditor's knowledge of such transac-
tions is limited to that acquired through his examination. Accordingly,
the fairness of the representations made through financial statements is
an implicit and integral part of management's responsibility. The inde-
pendent auditor may make suggestions as to the form or content of fi-
nancial statements, he may draft them in whole or in part, based on
management's accounts and records. However, his responsibility for the
statements he has examined is confined to the expression of his opinion
on them. The financial statements remain the representations of
management.
Professional Standards No. 1, § 110.02 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Accountants
1987).
132. An early report in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT disclosed that of the
twenty-five largest U.S. corporations, seven had been implicated in criminal con-
duct since 1976 and another seven had reached out-of-court settlements relating
to non-criminal activities. See Kelly, Corporate Crime The Untold Story, U.S.
News & World Report, Sept. 6, 1982 at 25; see also Comment, supra note 93, at
1393 n. 156.
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mands this extension. Certainly the auditor remains independent
of his client. With this independence comes the objectivity which
itself lends credence to the audit opinion. However this relation-
ship of independence is less than perfect. Because the client pays
for audit service, notions of client service and client advocacy may
interfere with professional judgment. Imposing a level of social and
legal responsibility, sufficient to remind the auditor of his overrid-
ing obligation of independence of judgment, is necessary to ensure
quality financial information. Heightened responsibility to the
public recognizes the contractual nature of the auditor-client rela-
tionship and mitigates against any infirmity of judgment occa-
sioned by the desire to best serve those who pay the fees.
The profession now faces a burgeoning problem of increasing
public expectations. The public expects far more from the profes-
sion than the profession has in the past given willingly. The courts
have forced on the profession a growing level of social responsibil-
ity consistent with their growing role in the business community.
This expansion of the auditor's role in the business community is
the genesis of many of the public policy arguments in favor of ex-
panding the scope of the auditor's social responsibility.
A. Fraud and the Audit
At one time, the detection of fraud- was paramount to the au-
dit process. 138 However, with the development of the accounting
profession and the increasing sophistication of information report-
ing processes and systems, the profession has adopted a more re-
laxed attitude regarding the detection of fraud."" In 1987, the
133. Id. at 3.7.
134. Id. at 3.8. Prior to 1977, the auditor assumed almost a passive role with
respect to the detection of fraud. "[T]hat ordinary examination directed to the
expression of an opinion on financial statements is not primarily or specifically
designed and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar
irregularities, although their discovery may result ... The responsibility of the
independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to
clients and to others) arises only when such failure clearly results from failure to
comply with generally accepted auditing standards." Professional Standards No.
1, § 110.05 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Accountants 1973).
In 1977, the AICPA revised its prior position in favor of auditing standards
which describe the auditor's responsibility for the detection of errors or irregulari-
ties. "The term 'errors' refers to unintentional mistakes in financial statements
and includes mathematical or clerical mistakes in the underlying records and ac-
counting data from which the financial statements were prepared . . . ." Profes-
sional Standards No. 1 § 327.02 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Accountants 1987).
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AICPA revised its approach to detecting and reporting errors and
irregularities in financial statements. These revised policies pro-
vide that:
(1) The auditor should assess the risk that errors and irregu-
larities may cause the financial statements to contain a material
misstatement. Based on that assessment, the auditor should de-
sign the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors
and irregularities that are material to the financial statements;
(2) Because of the characteristics of irregularities, particu-
larly those involving forgery and collusion, properly designed and
executed audit may not detect a material irregularity;
(3) The auditor should exercise:
(a) due care in planning, performing, and evaluating
the results of audit procedures;
(b) the proper degree of professional skepticism to
achieve reasonable assurance that material errors or irreg-
ularities will be detected;
(4) The subsequent discovery that a material misstatement
exists in the financial statements does not, in and of itself, evi-
dence inadequate planning, performance, or judgment on the part
of the auditor. 35
To the extent that this professional responsibility with respect
to detecting fraud imparts on the auditor an obligation to search
for fraud,'36 the auditor now must assume an active role with re-
"The term 'irregularities' refers to intentional distortions of financial statements,
such as deliberate misrepresentations by management, sometimes referred to as
management fraud, or misappropriations of assets, sometimes referred to as defal-
cations." Id. at § 327.03. Section 327 embodies the new Statement on Auditing
Standards 16 (SAS 16). Under SAS 16, the independent auditor had the responsi-
bility to plan his examination to search for errors or irregularities that would have
a material affect on the financial statements. Id. at § 327.05. In this regard, SAS
16 represented a conscious departure from the prior passive role of the auditor in
the detection of fraud. SAS 16, however, is not the final word. In 1987, the Audit-
ing Standards Board (ASB) approved issuance of nine new Statements on Audit-
ing Standards (SAS). SAS 16 was revoked and replaced by SAS 53, The Auditor's
Responsibility To Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities. SAS 53 defines
errors as referring to "unintentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or
disclosures in the financial statements. Irregularities include fraudulent financial
reporting undertaken to render financial statements misleading (i.e., management
fraud) and misappropriation of assets (i.e., defalcations)." AICPA Strategic Brief-
ing Report on the New Statements on Auditing Standards at 53-1 [hereinafter
"AICPA Strategic Briefing Report"].
135. AICPA Strategic Briefing Report at 53-1.
136. Numerous cases emphasize the point that, professional responsibilities
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spect to the detection of errors and irregularities.137 This does not
suggest that all audits must be specifically designed and imple-
mented to detect fraud. An audit specifically designed and imple-
mented toward the detection of fraud is far more extensive and
costly than a regular audit oriented toward the expressing of an
opinion on a set of financial statements. The auditor performs a
number of special tests and extensively investigates a great many
transactions in an exacting detail far and again more extensive
than the procedures followed in a regular audit. Additionally, at
least at the outset of the engagement, the client is the one who will
be forced to bear the costs of these additional procedures.
Indeed, the question of who should bear the burden of com-
mitting these additional resources to the detection of fraud de-
pends in large part on the proper allocation of the risk of fraud as
it impacts financial information.1 38 There must come a point where
a user of financial information is forced to bear the burdens of his
reliance. The investment decision must be based on more than a
reading of financial statements. The investor must investigate the
notwithstanding, the auditor has the duty to probe suspicious circumstances and
the duty to investigate for fraud or management misrepresentations even absent
suspicious audit evidence. See United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2nd Cir.
1972); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1006 (1969); S.E.C. v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2nd Cir. 1968); United States v. Ben-
jamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1964); and 1136 Tenants Corp. v. Max Rothenberg
& Co., 36 App. Div. 2d. 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1971), aff'd., 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281
N.E. 2d 846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972). Professor Fiflis maintains that the exis-
tence of a legal duty to use due care to discover fraud is an essential element of an
auditor's responsibility to third parties. Fiflis, 28 VAND. L. REV. at 93. Fiflis argues
that there is a legal duty supported by case law, to make an inquiry into suspi-
cious circumstances, and in the absence of circumstances, there is nonetheless the
duty to investigate, but to a lesser degree. Id. at 102.
137. SAS 53 requires that the auditor design the audit to provide reasonable
assurance that material errors and irregularities will be detected. By contrast, its
predecessor, SAS 16, required only that the auditor plan the audit to search for
material irregularities. The former represents an increased responsibility. SAS 53
also identifies cases where auditors may have a responsibility to report fraud to
people outside the client, including auditor changes reported to the S.E.C. on
Form 8-K, inquiries from successor auditors, responses to court subpoenas, and
reports on governmental audits. However, SAS 53 does not establish new respon-
sibilities for reporting fraud outside the client; those responsibilities exist now.
AICPA Strategic Briefing Report at 53-9.
138. One commentator suggests that expanding notions of auditor liability
may be reconsidered by reference to notions of cost allocation and distribution.
See Comment, Extensions of Accountants' Liability for Negligence: One Step
Closer to a New Implied Warranty of Results, 56 U. OF COLO. L. REV. 265 (1985).
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reputation, qualifications, and past performance of management to
identify risk factors not otherwise expressed in the audited finan-
cial statements. Now the investor is allocated a portion of the risk
of investment which will more equitably distribute any potential
loss among the parties best suited to bear the risks. If the account-
ant is negligent and as such is the cause of the investor's loss, then
the accountant should bear the burden of this loss. "In the final
analysis the injured party should recover damages due to an inde-
pendent auditor's negligence from that auditor. This would shift
the loss from the innocent creditor or investor to the one responsi-
ble for the loss. '" 9 However, if the investor relies on a properly
audited set of financial statements and loses his investment, the
investor is better postured to bear this risk of loss. This risk alloca-
tion results in a form of social insurance, each party bearing the
loss and reaping the benefits of success based on his inherent re-
sponsibilities to the decision making process.
Unfortunately, implementing this approach is problematic.
Much of the information required to adequately analyze invest-
ment risk far exceeds the reach and analytical ability of the aver-
age investor. Indeed, the task of identifying and allocating risk is
so intertwined with the audit process itself that the auditor is
often the only party to analyze this risk based on full information.
Thus the problem of allocating responsibility for analyzing envi-
ronmental risks has been settled by conflicting misperceptions.
Such conflicting perceptions, when considered in light of the fact
that the auditors only contact with the public users of their work
product is through their written audit opinions, has led to the ex-
pectation gap, a serious state of miscommunication between the
accounting profession and the public at large.14 0
139. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at __ , 461 A.2d at 152.
140. Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and
Recommendations 33 (1978).
This problem was highlighted in a 1978 report to the AICPA by the Commis-
sion on Auditors Responsibilities.
Recent research suggests that many users misunderstand the auditor's
role and responsibilities .. .Users are unaware of the limitations of the
audit function and are confused about the distinction between the re-
sponsibilities of management and those of the auditor.
Id.
Respecting the auditors responsibilities for the detection of fraud, the report
notes:
[D]espite efforts by many auditors to downgrade the importance of the
detection of fraud as an audit objective, all segments of the public -
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B. Business Failure and The Audit Environment
Coexistent with the increased public reliance on the account-
ing profession is an increased public scrutiny of the role of an audi-
tor respecting the failure of a business. Inherent in the assumption
that an auditor is independent of corporate management is the no-
tion that the auditor is not primarily responsible for faulty deci-
including the most knowledgeable users of financial information - ap-
pear to consider the detection of fraud as a necessary and important ob-
jective of an audit. Users expect the auditor to be concerned with the
possibility of fraud ... They expect him to protect the interest of share-
holders and be independent of management in doing so.
Id. at 31-32.
In 1985, a private-sector research initiative, jointly sponsored and funded by
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the American Accounting
Association, the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors,
and the National Association of Accountants, undertook to research the problems
attendant to fraudulent financial reporting practices. The results of their efforts
are mainifested in the Report of the National Commission of Fraudulent Finan-
cial Reporting, October 1987, ("The Treadway Commission"). The Commission
had three major objectives:
1. Consider the extent to which acts of fraudulent financial report-
ing undermine the integrity of financial reporting; the forces and the op-
portunities, environmental, institutional, or individual, that may contrib-
ute to these acts; the extent to which fraudulent financial reporting can
be prevented or deterred and to which it can be detected sooner after
occurence; the extent, if any, to which incidents of this type of fraud may
be the product of a decline in professionalism of corporate financial of-
ficers and internal auditors; and the extent, if any, to which the regulator
and law enforcement and environment unwittingly may have tolerated or
contributed to the occurrences of this type of fraud.
2. Examine the role of the independent public accountant in de-
tecting fraud, focusing particularly on whether the detection of fraudu-
lent financial reporting has been neglected or insufficiently focused on
and whether the ability of the independent public accountant to detect
such fraud can be enhanced, and consider whether changes in auditing
standards or procedures - internal and external - would reduce the extent
of fraudulent financial reporting.
,3. Identify attributes of corporate structure that may contribute to
acts of fraudulent financial reporting or to the failure to detect such acts
promptly.
Treadway Commission Report at 2.
This comprehensive effort resulted in numerous recommendations addressed to
corporate management, the S.E.C. and other regulatory agencies, the accounting
profession, and the educational system in general. Moreover, these recommenda-
tions occasioned scrutiny of then-existing audit standards respecting an auditor's
duty to investigate fraud.
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sions on the part of corporate management. This is not to suggest
that auditors ignore their client's management information sys-
tems in the course of their audit. Before an auditor makes any de-
termination regarding the reliability of a client's accounting sys-
tem, he must undertake a rigorous review to verify the veracity
and reliability of the information that the system generates.
One problem with the nature of this review of accounting sys-
tems and internal control is that the risk of business failure is not
directly coexistent or coextensive with the risks of veracity and re-
liability which inhere in the financial reporting system used. In
many cases, the risk of business failure depends on the strength
and vitality of the management decision making process and the
systems used to implement these decisions. This is a decision-mak-
ing environment, independent of the financial reporting system;
yet, a review of the management decision making environment is
frequently absent from the auditors review of internal accounting
controls and the accounting environment.
The profession has not turned its back to the impact that
management decision making plays on the overall financial health
of a business. The Statement on Auditing Standards No. 34, The
Auditors Considerations When a Question Arises About an En-
tity's Continued Existence,"1 imposed an affirmative duty on the
auditor, as a part of his obligations under the generally accepted
auditing standards, to review various forms of financial and nonfi-
nancial information when he becomes aware of information that
raises questions as to the continued existence and viability of an
entity. 42 However, this was a contingent review, dependent upon
the existence of information raising "going concern" questions. It
did not impose this responsibility in all situations as a part of the
regular audit process.
In 1987, the AICPA withdrew SAS No. 34 replacing it with
SAS No. 59, which addressed the auditor's considerations of an en-
tity's ability to continue as a going concern. 43 SAS No. 59 recog-
nizes generally that auditors assume that an entity has the ability
to remain a viable going concern. The AICPA recognizes that "in-
formation that significantly contradicts the going concern assump-
tion relates the the entity's inability to continue to meet its obliga-
tions as they become due without a substantial disposition of
141. AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards No. 34.
142. Id.
143. AICPA Strategic Briefing Report, at 59-1.
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assets, restructuring debt, externally forced revisions of its opera-
tions, or similar actions.' 1 44 Under SAS No. 59:
1. The auditor has a responsibility to evaluate whether there
is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a go-
ing concern for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed one
year beyond the date of the financial statements being audited.
2. The auditor's evaluation is based on knowledge of relevant
conditions and events that exist at or have occurred prior to the
completion of field work.
3. Information about such conditions or events is obtained
from the application of auditing procedures planned and per-
formed to achieve audit objectives in the financial statements be-
ing audited.
4. The auditor is not responsible for predicting future condi-
tions or events. The fact that the entity may cease to exist as a
going concern subsequent to receiving a report from the auditor
that does not refer to substantial doubt, even within one year fol-
lowing the date of the financial statements, does not, in itself, in-
dicated inadequate performance by the auditor.
5. The absence of reference to substantial doubt in an audi-
tor's report should not be viewed as providing assurance as to an
entity's ability to continue as a going concern.146
If, during the course of an audit, the auditor discovers certain
events or conditions which may bear on his determination of the
entity's ability to continue as a viable enterprise,'46 the auditor
must accumulate information regarding these conditions and
events and summarize the same in an explanatory paragraph, as
part of the audit opinion, to reflect the results of his
determination.147
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The following are examples of such conditions or events: (a) negative
trends, for example, recurring operating losses; (b) other indications of possible
financial difficulties, such as default on loans or similar agreements; (c) internal
matters such as work stoppages or other labor difficulties; and (d) external mat-
ters that have occurred, for example legal proceedings, legislation, or similar mat-
ters, that might jeopardize an entities ability to operate. AICPA Strategic Briefing
Report at 59-2.
147. A sample explanatory paragraph would read:
The accompanying financial statements have been prepared assuming
that Company Y will continue as a going concern. As discussed in Note
X to the financial statements, Company Y has suffered recurring losses
from operations and has a net capital deficiency that raises substantial
doubt about the entities' ability to continue as a going concern. Manage-
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Thus, the AICPA recognizes the problems attendant to allo-
cating the risk of detecting potential business failure. This is ac-
complished by requiring a modification of the audit process to ac-
commodate this new standard of risk allocation.
The problems attendant to allocating the risk of detection of
potential business failure to the auditors, require a modification of
the audit process to accomodate this new standard of risk alloca-
tion. In addition to a general expansion of the audit scope, several
additional factors will also aid in the allocation of the risk of loss
among the accounting profession and the users of their work prod-
uct. These considerations revolve around the burden of proof as-
sumed by a plaintiff in an action against an auditor. The nature
and extent of this burden must be considered in light of the same
policy considerations cited in support of imposing liability on neg-
ligent auditors. This requires a distinction between allowing a
plaintiff to state a cause of action against auditors for negligence
and allowing the same plaintiffs to prevail in damages on this
cause of action; there are no foregone conclusions of liability based
solely on the information stated in a complaint. Plaintiffs asserting
a negligence cause of action must be forced to plead and prove
that they received the audited statements from the company pur-
suant to a proper company purpose, that they, in accordance with
that purpose, relied on the statements and that the misstate-
ments therein were due to the auditor's negligence and were a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage." 8
Seminal to a finding of liability is proof of reliance on misstated
financial statements. This reliance is the basis for an intelligent
system of risk allocation among the preparers, the auditors, and
the users of financial information. However, requiring reliance in-
volves related issues of defining how much reliance is enough and
whether the alleged reliance is sufficient to allow a user to be rea-
sonably informed. The requirement of reliance as a basis for im-
posing auditor liability creates a quasi-contractual relationship be-
tween the auditor and the user of his work product. The law allows
this relationship to survive the rigors of summary judgment by not
imposing the formal privity of contract requirements of the Ul-
ment's plans in this regard are also described in Note X. The financial
statements do not include any adjustments that might result from the
outcome from this uncertainty.
AICPA Strategic Briefing Report at 59-4 to 59-5.
148. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at __ , 461 A.2d at 152.
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tramares14 9 genre. And privity notwithstanding, this relationship
must exist before the auditor should be forced to bear the cost of
his negligence. By implication, this quasi-contractual relationship
is born of two distinct suppositions: first, the auditor who uses his
expertise to render a service which involves giving his expert opin-
ion, agrees to insure users of his opinion against any loss for his
negligence; and second, users, before they seek any indemnification
against this loss, agree to use the financial statements and to rely
on the statements such that their loss is not attributable to their
own negligent financial analysis.
In proving reliance, the plaintiffs must be forced to prove that
they relied on all of the information contained in the statements,
as the audit opinion extends only to the statements taken as a
whole, and cannot be limited to any individual item not considered
in this general context. Thus, in cases where the statements con-
tain information in a note which is not mathematically quantified
in the income statement, balance sheet, or statement of changes in
financial condition, but which is adequately and fully disclosed in
the note, then plaintiffs should not be heard to complain of a loss,
when their investment decision would have been different but for
the fact that they did not read the notes to the financial state-
ment.150 The auditor reviews financial statements as a whole body
149. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
150. Related to the issue of requiring reliance on the financial statements
taken as a whole, including footnote disclosures, is the issue of whether the infor-
mation in the footnotes is adequately presented and whether the information is
such that it is better quantified and included in the numerical disclosures in the
financial statements; This inquiry is especially important in light of the Raritan
Steel holding, in which the creditor maintained a cause of action based on a single
numerical excerpt contained in a credit report. This raises the question of
whether the financial condition of the corporation, as related to their ability to
continue business as a going concern, was adequately disclosed elsewhere in the
financial statement, and whether the creditors, had they taken the time to read
the entire financial statement, would have been appraised of this investment risk.
Generally, information left for footnote disclosure is either included in foot-
notes for futher explanation or because, at the audit date, there was not a suffi-
cient amount of available data which would lend itself to quantitative disclosure.
This distinguishes between information which is quantified and shown in the re-
sults of the corporation's operations and information which is qualified, the finan-
cial impact or potential impact of which is discussed, but not quantified and in-
cluded in the results of operations. Generally, this is left to the professional
judgment of the auditor, such judgment being limited however, to cases in which
the quantitative effect of footnote disclosure cannot be made. Most auditors will
try to quantify the inforniation for numerical presentation, before being forced to
1989]
49
Zisa: Guarding the Guardians: Expanding Auditor Negligence Liability to
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
of information. Allowing a cause of action for negligence on less
than full reliance blunts the force of later arguments in favor of a
more rigorous standard of reliance.
Second to proving the extent of the plaintiff's reliance on fi-
nancial statments is the question of whether this reliance is suffi-
cient to allow a reasonably informed investment decision. An in-
vestor must be forced to base his investment decision on more
than a mere reading of financial statements. It is not unreasonable
to require him to also understand what he is reading. This is not to
require the same level of understanding as that of an expert in fi-
nancial analysis. Rather, the user of financial information must be
forced to posture himself such that he is as equally informed as
another reasonably prudent investor making a similar decision. If
the investor is unfamiliar with finanical analysis, he certainly can-
not gain any insights by merely reading financial statements. This
would be akin to teaching one to cook by allowing him to sample
the finished product. An investor must prepare himself in advance
of his reading of financial information, with enough basic knowl-
edge of financial analysis, to make his reliance on financial infor-
mation a meaningful reliance.
Requiring this level of reliance will preserve the integrity of
the risk allocation system. It will ensure that only deserving plain-
tiffs are allowed to recover by forcing them to show that their loss
is not predicated on their own negligent decisions. Also, it will
force the profession to be held accountable to the users of their
work product by allowing recovery to users who take the extra
steps to inform themselves prior to making their decision. This
way the costs of negligence will be allocated, as between the negli-
gent investor and the negligent auditor, to the parties best suited
to bear this cost. When considering in light of the aftermath of a
business failure, this risk allocation appears abundantly equitable.
Often, in the wake of a business failure, the accounting firms are
the only available source of money to compensate the investors for
disclose potential problems in the footnotes alone. The disclosure decision is also
relevant to the type of opinion issued. In cases there exist certain conditions
which may have a material effect on financial statements but which are incapable
of quantification, the auditors generally reflect the same in their opinions, by issu-
ing an opinion "quantified" to reflect the unresolved issue. In situations such as
this, the auditors often find themselves at odds with management, who, on the
one hand, do not want unfavorable information quantified and disclosed with the
results of operations, and on the other hand, do not want less than a clean
opinion.
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their loss. This system of risk allocation will prevent many frivo-
lous claims made against the "only pocket" containing any money,
the accounting firms. Those who should bear the loss, will bear the
loss, and business failure notwithstanding, the plaintiff who did
not reasonably inform himself as a prerequisite to making his in-
vestment decision and who did not reasonably rely on the available
financial information, will be denied recovery, regardless of the au-
ditor's negligence.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many policy considerations, sounded in terms of the
growing public expectations of the accounting profession, which
the profession has been slow to accept. In the future, the courts
will consider these policy considerations in any analysis involving
suits against auditors. At that time, if the profession is still slow to
accept this growing public responsibility, there is little serious
question but that the judicial system will impose these obligations
on the profession and the profession will be forced to unwillingly
accept them. Auditors as professionals have it in their control to
voluntarily assume these responsibilities, free from judicial defini-
tion, in such a manner as to give a sense of balance to the issue of
professional liability for the performance of the audit services. Au-
ditors should be receptive to changes, such as those enacted by the
AICPA. They should undertake the changes willingly, as a natural
outgrowth of the development of their profession. In addition, they
should be willing to be held responsible for their actions, without
retreating behind notions of privity or actually foreseen users. The
Supreme Court has christened the profession "public watchdog."''
151. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984). The
Court stated:
By certifying the reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility tran-
scending any employment relationship with the client. The independent
public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate alle-
giance to the corporations's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the
investing public. This 'public watchdog' function demands that the ac-
countant maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from disclosure
a certified public accountant's interpretations of the client's financial
statements would be to ignore the significance of the accountant's role as
a disinterested analysis charged with public obligations.
Id. at 817-18.
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If the word "public" in "certified public accountant" is to continue
to have meaning, the profession must willingly accept increased re-
sponsibility for its actions and continually strive for excellence in
their increasing areas of public responsibility.
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